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Preface
The impressive economic growth in Asia has been accompanied, unfortunately, 
by widening inequality. Education can play a vital role in reducing inequality 
and preparing citizens for inclusive economic growth, but does not always do so. 
Developing Asia must pursue education policies and systems that are inclusive 
and provide opportunities for individuals to achieve their full learning potential 
and acquire relevant knowledge and skills to effectively serve as members of the 
society and to contribute to inclusive economic growth. In addition, equitable 
and cost-efficient use of financing and other resources is critical when countries 
are expanding their education systems to serve growing student populations. 
Governments and development partners in the region are intensifying 
policy dialogue on these issues. However, issues of shadow education must also 
be brought into the equation. Shadow education can seriously undermine the 
efforts to expand equitable access and strengthen inclusiveness in education 
systems. It can also undermine efforts to improve the quality, relevance, and cost 
efficiency of education. 
Shadow education systems are expanding at an alarming rate in Asia. 
Households in certain countries spend staggering portions of their incomes on 
shadow education. There are various reasons for this; poor quality of education 
in schools is not the only one. In several countries in the region, including some 
with high-quality school systems, shadow education appears to have become 
a permanent feature. However, even in these countries it can be steered and 
regulated; and in other countries proactive measures can prevent or minimize 
some of the problems that have become evident elsewhere. Sharing lessons and 
knowledge about the trend and its implications will help such efforts and support 
dialogue on these issues among stakeholders of education.
This publication on shadow education is a product of partnership between 
the Asian Development Bank and the Comparative Education Research Centre 
of the University of Hong Kong. The publication presents a comprehensive 
study prepared by Mark Bray and Chad Lykins. It provides an overview of the 
shadow education phenomenon with detailed mapping of patterns in the Asian 
region, and discusses drivers of demand for, and determinants of the supply 
of, shadow education. It provides evidence of the serious financial and other 
consequences of the expanding shadow education systems in the region. Drawing 
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on the analysis, the study discusses implications for policy makers and presents 
concrete recommendations. 
I would like to thank and commend the authors for preparing this 
high-quality and timely knowledge product. Many thanks also go to Dorothy 
Geronimo, for coordination of the publishing process; Steve Banta, for editorial 
advice; and Hazel Medrano, for administrative support.
Jouko Sarvi
Practice Leader (Education Sector)
Regional and Sustainable Development Department
Asian Development Bank
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xExecutive Summary
Policy makers have long recognized the importance of education for economic 
and social development in Asia. However, they have focused mostly on 
mainstream institutions, i.e., kindergartens, schools, and universities. They have 
neglected the role of private supplementary tutoring, which may have negative as 
well as positive dimensions.
Private supplementary tutoring is widely known as shadow education, 
since it mimics the mainstream. As the content of mainstream education changes, 
so does the content of the shadow. And as the mainstream grows, so does the 
shadow. This study shows that shadow education has a long history in parts of 
the region, but in recent decades it has greatly expanded. In the Republic of Korea 
nearly 90% of elementary students receive some sort of shadow education; and 
in Hong Kong, China, about 85% of senior secondary students do so. Figures 
are equally striking in less prosperous parts of the region. In West Bengal, India, 
nearly 60% of primary school students receive private supplementary tutoring; 
and in Kazakhstan a similar proportion of students do so at the senior secondary 
level. Proportions are lower in other countries, but throughout the region the 
shadow is spreading and intensifying.
Among the beneficial dimensions of private tutoring are the ways in which 
it can help slow learners to keep up with their peers, and can help high achievers 
reach new levels. The extra learning may contribute human capital for economic 
development, and many families consider extra lessons to be a constructive way 
to use the spare time of adolescents who might otherwise be at loose ends. On 
the negative side, private tutoring may dominate the lives of young people and 
their families, reducing the time available for sports and other activities, which 
are important for well-rounded development. Shadow education also maintains 
and exacerbates social inequalities. Rich families are clearly able to pay for better 
quality and greater quantities of tutoring than can middle-income and poor 
families, and disparities may threaten social cohesion. Moreover, tutoring can 
create inefficiencies in education systems. Particularly problematic are situations 
in which teachers deliberately reduce the effort that they devote to their regular 
classes in order to reserve energy for private tutoring. 
This study commences by mapping the landscape of shadow education, 
presenting data on enrollment rates, intensity and demographic variations, and 
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subjects and modes. The initial chapter also notes the costs of tutoring. At the 
extreme is the Republic of Korea, where household expenditures on shadow 
education have been equivalent to about 80% of government expenditures on 
public education for primary and secondary students. Expenditures are lower in 
other countries, but they are headed in the same direction. 
The question then arising concerns the impact of these investments. 
Research on the extent to which shadow education “works,” in the sense of 
delivering higher academic grades, presents mixed findings. Much depends not 
only on the motivations and abilities of the students but also on the motivations 
and abilities of the tutors. In many countries, individuals can become tutors 
without training, and the effectiveness of some forms of tutoring is doubtful.
From the review of patterns around the region, including the factors 
that drive demand, the study turns to the implications for policy makers. The 
first step, the study argues, is to recognize the existence of shadow education. 
It should be brought much more actively into the policy-making arena, with 
stronger elements of research-based evidence. Then policy makers may consider 
various ways to encourage desirable forms of shadow education and discourage 
undesirable forms. They may reform systems of assessment and selection, which 
are among the most immediate drivers of demand for tutoring. They can also 
change elements of the curriculum and harness technology. 
Alongside these measures, policy makers would be wise to devise and 
implement regulations on the tutoring industry. In general, private tutoring 
is poorly supervised and inadequately regulated, especially in comparison 
with mainstream schooling. Much can be learned from comparative analysis 
of regulations to identify what might be desirable and workable in particular 
situations. Policy makers may find partners to assist in this task, starting with the 
schools but including community groups and the tutoring industry itself. 
Finally, policy makers may learn from the shadow. They should ask why 
it exists in the first place, and what can be done in the mainstream to make 
supplementary tutoring less desirable and necessary. Such efforts are needed not 
only for reasons of social equity but also for the efficiency of education systems.

1Introduction
The period since the turn of the century has seen considerable expansion of what 
is widely called the shadow education system of private supplementary tutoring. 
This phenomenon, which has spread globally (Bray 2009, Mori and Baker 2010), 
has historically been most visible in East Asia. Japan has long been known for 
its juku, which operate alongside and supplement the school system for young 
people of all ages (Harnisch 1994, Roesgaard 2006); and the Republic of Korea 
has similarly long been known for its counterpart hagwons (Zeng 1999, Seth 
2002). Now the shadow sector is strongly visible throughout Asia as well as in 
other world regions.
Although the term shadow education is used widely, it is not always 
employed with consistent meaning. It is therefore necessary at the outset to 
identify the parameters of the present study. It is concerned with tutoring in 
academic subjects that is provided for a fee and that takes place outside standard 
school hours. The study is not concerned with tutoring in sports or music except 
insofar as they are assessed subjects for advancement in education systems. Also, 
the study is not concerned with tutoring provided free of charge by teachers, 
family members, community groups, or other bodies. Such tutoring may of 
course be very valuable, but it has different policy implications from the types of 
fee-paying tutoring on which this study focuses. 
Concerning levels of education, the study focuses on primary and secondary 
schooling. Private supplementary tutoring certainly exists at the preprimary and 
postsecondary levels, and such tutoring raises important policy issues. However, 
the issues are rather different at those levels and as such are best treated separately.
The study uses the metaphor of the shadow because much private 
supplementary tutoring mimics the mainstream (Stevenson and Baker 1992, 
Bray 1999b, Lee et al. 2009). Thus, as the curriculum of the mainstream changes, 
so does the curriculum in the shadow. And as the mainstream expands, so does 
the shadow. Shadows may of course be both useful and problematic. The shadow 
cast by a sundial can tell observers about the time of day, and the shadow of 
an education system may tell observers about the features of mainstream 
school systems. By contrast, the term shadow economy has an implication of 
unauthorized practices of possibly doubtful morality, and some observers have 
similar perspectives on aspects of the shadow education system. An underlying 
2 Shadow Education
premise of this study is that shadow education can have both positive and 
negative dimensions. On the positive side it can promote personal academic 
development and contribute to human capital for wider economic advance. 
It may also offer educational resources with more flexibility and better timing 
than the mainstream sector. But on the negative side, shadow education may 
exacerbate social inequalities, cause stress for individuals and families, create 
inefficiencies in education systems, and contribute to forms of corruption. The 
challenge for policy makers and administrators is to find ways to encourage the 
positive dimensions and limit the negative ones.
A wide range of types of private tutoring exists. At one end of the scale is 
one-on-one tutoring, commonly delivered in the homes of either the tutors or 
their students. Alternatively, pupils may receive tutoring in small, medium-sized, 
or large groups. At the extreme, pupils may pack into large lecture theaters, with 
overflow rooms operating with video screens. Other tutoring may be provided by 
the internet, and indeed can be conducted across national and even continental 
borders. This range of types of tutoring requires a corresponding range of 
responses by policy makers.
Geographically, the study embraces a very diverse region, stretching from 
Mongolia in the north to Indonesia in the south, and from Georgia in the west 
to Japan in the east. Some countries (such as Japan and Republic of Korea) are 
prosperous, while others (such as Bangladesh and Tajikistan) are impoverished. 
Some (such as People’s Republic of China [PRC] and India) have very large 
populations, while others (such as Brunei Darussalam and Maldives) have very 
small ones. The set of countries also displays diverse colonial legacies, including 
those of France, Netherlands, Portugal, the former Soviet Union, United 
Kingdom, and United States (US). This diversity is in some respects a challenge 
for analysis but is also an asset, because it permits identification of the influence 
of contextual factors and of features that are consistent across diverse societies. 
Finally, some remarks are needed on the evidence base. The study draws 
mainly on published research literature supplemented by interviews with 
personnel in ministries of education, international agencies, and other bodies. 
These sources permit overall mapping, but many information gaps remain. Asian 
researchers, and particularly ones in East Asia, arguably lead the world in this 
area. Yet much more work is needed for policy makers and others to have a firm 
grasp of the dimensions and implications of shadow education in a full range 
of settings.
3Mapping the Landscape
The statistical database on private supplementary tutoring is much less robust 
than that for school systems (and even for school systems, cross-national 
databases display many limitations). Nevertheless, the range of studies currently 
in existence provides enough detail to sketch an overall map that captures 
the major features of the landscape, even if omitting some of the fine-grained 
contours. This chapter commences with enrollment rates in shadow education 
before turning to intensity and demographic variations, subjects and modes, and 
finally the costs of shadow education.
Enrollment Rates
Box 1 presents data on shadow education in the majority of countries of 
the region. Not all countries are included, since as yet the topic has not been 
researched everywhere. In most locations, shadow education has come onto the 
research agenda only relatively recently. The chief exceptions to this statement 
are Japan and Republic of Korea, where private tutoring has been a major point 
of public controversy since the 1960s and where a significant body of quantitative 
and qualitative research has examined the phenomenon over the decades (Kim 
and Hunt 1968, Rohlen 1980, Horio 1986, Sawada and Kobayashi 1986, Han and 
Kim 1997, Seth 2002). 
Another caution concerning Box 1 is that the studies cited have diverse foci 
and methodological approaches. Some address primary education, while others 
address secondary education. Some are drawn from large databases, while others 
rely on small samples. Some have clear definitions of private tutoring, while 
others have diffuse definitions. And some are based on household surveys, while 
others have been specifically designed for the education sector. As such, the set of 
studies cannot easily be placed on a single scale. Private tutoring is increasingly 
being included in cross-national studies that use standardized instruments across 
groups of countries. The most obvious are the Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study, conducted under the auspices of the International Association 
for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), and the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), conducted under the auspices of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The 
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studies did provide some relevant information (e.g., Nonoyama-Tarumi 2011, 
OECD 2011b); but the questions asked did not permit clear separation of fee-
paying tutoring from fee-free tutoring or identification of the intensities of 
tutoring (Bray 2010:7–8).
Box 1 Cross-National Indicators of Private Tutoring
Location Patterns
Armenia The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2007:45) 
stated that 47% of secondary school students employ private 
tutors, often for two or more subjects and spending an average of 
30–35 hours per week.
Azerbaijan Silova and Kazimzade (2006) asked 913 first year university students 
about their experiences in the last year of secondary schooling. 
They found that 93.0% of students had received tutoring (private 
lessons, preparatory courses, or both).
Bangladesh Nath (2011b) analyzed data from household surveys. He found 
that in 2008, 37.9% of primary students and 68.4% of secondary 
students were receiving tutoring. In Grade 10, over 80% received 
tutoring.
Brunei 
Darussalam
Wong et al. (2007:455) examined the ways that Primary 6 students 
learned mathematics. In their sample of 209 students, 69% had 
received extra lessons, of which most were assumed to be from 
private tutors.
Cambodia Respondents in 31.2% of 77 primary schools surveyed in 1997/98 
indicated that pupils received tutoring, which consumed 6.6% of 
the costs of primary education (Bray 1999a:57). A 2004 follow-
up study showed that costs increased markedly at the secondary 
level (Bray and Bunly 2005:42). Dawson (2011:18), surveying 
eight primary schools in three locations, found that about half 
of the students had received tutoring. Brehm and Silova (2012) 
presented data echoing these findings.
China, 
People’s 
Republic of
The 2004 Urban Household Education and Employment Survey 
of 4,772 households indicated that 73.8% of primary students 
were receiving supplementary lessons, including in non-academic 
subjects. Proportions in lower and upper secondary were 65.6% 
and 53.5% (Xue and Ding 2009). A 2010 survey of 6,474 
students in Jinan found that 28.8% of lower secondary students 
were receiving tutoring in mathematics, and 29.3% in English 
(Zhang 2011). 
continued on next page
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Georgia Matiashvili and Kutateladze (2006) asked 839 first year university 
students about their experiences in the last year of secondary 
schooling. They found that 76.0% of the students had received 
tutoring (private lessons, preparatory courses, or both). A 2011 
survey of 1,200 secondary school students and graduates in all 
regions showed that a quarter of secondary school students had 
received tutoring, with variations of 35% in the capital city and 
19% in villages (EPPM 2011).
Hong Kong, 
China
A 2009 telephone survey of 521 students found that 72.5% of upper 
primary students had received tutoring (Ngai and Cheung 2010); 
and a survey of 898 secondary students found that 72.5% in lower 
secondary had received tutoring, while proportions in middle and 
senior secondary were 81.9% and 85.5%, respectively (Caritas 2010).
India Sujatha and Rani (2011:113) reported on a survey of senior 
secondary students in four states: Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, 
Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh: in the sample, 58.8% of Grade 
10 students were receiving tutoring. Sen (2010:315) stated that at 
the primary level in West Bengal, 57% of students were receiving 
private tutoring. Data from a nationwide rural survey showed rates 
in Grades 4–8 ranging from 2.8% in Chhattisgarh to 77.2% in 
Tripura (Pratham 2011:58). 
Indonesia Suryadama et al. (2006) noted the widespread existence of private 
tutoring at the primary level, but without specific numerical 
estimates. Informal evidence indicates that it is also widespread at 
the secondary level.
Japan A 2007 survey found that juku served 15.9% of primary 1 children, 
that this proportion rose steadily in later grades, and that it 
reached 65.2% in junior secondary 3. In addition, 6.8% of junior 
secondary 3 pupils received tutoring at home, and 15.0% followed 
correspondence courses (Japan 2008:13).
Kazakhstan Kalikova and Rakhimzhanova (2009) asked 1,004 first year 
university students about their experiences in the last year of 
secondary schooling. They found that 59.9% of students had 
received tutoring (private lessons, preparatory courses, or both). 
Korea, 
Republic of
In 2008, 87.9% of elementary school pupils were estimated to be 
receiving tutoring. In middle school the proportion was 72.5%; 
and in general high school it was 60.5% (Kim 2010:302).
Kyrgyz 
Republic
Bagdasarova and Ivanov (2009) asked 1,100 first year university 
students about their experiences in the last year of secondary 
schooling. They found that 52.5% of students had received 
tutoring (private lessons, preparatory courses, or both).
continued on next page
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Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 
Benveniste et al. (2008:76, 106) indicated that 14% of lower 
secondary teachers provided supplementary tutoring, which earned 
one-third of their total incomes. Another study of 2,082 primary 
school teachers in 449 schools indicated that 4.7% provided 
supplementary tutoring in exchange for a fee (Dang et al. 2010). 
Malaysia Kenayathulla (2012) examined data from the 2004/05 household 
expenditure survey and found that 20.1% of households indicated 
expenditures on private tutoring. Tan (2011: 105), having surveyed 
1,600 students in eight schools in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, 
found that 88.0% had received tutoring during their primary 
schooling. 
Maldives Nazeer (2006:159) remarked that private tutoring “is very 
common.” All nine teachers in his qualitative research were 
providing additional private lessons for their own students. 
Mongolia Dong et al. (2006) asked 1,475 first year university students 
about their experiences in the last year of secondary schooling. 
They found that 66.0% of students had received tutoring (private 
lessons, preparatory courses, or both).
Myanmar A 1992 report (Myanmar Education Research Bureau 1992:24) 
described private tutoring as “virtually indispensible to complete 
secondary education.” Informal evidence indicated that two 
decades later the problem remained unabated. Much tutoring 
also existed at the primary level. An unpublished 2009 survey in 
25 townships found that tutoring consumed 12.6% of household 
costs of Grade 1 schooling and 15.6% of Grade 5 schooling.
Nepal Jayachandran (2008) examined data from 450 schools in 
28 districts. She found that 38% of students in public schools 
were receiving additional private tutoring from their schools, while 
the figure for students in private schools was 32%. Additional 
students presumably received tutoring from tutors outside the 
schools. Thapa (2011) reported on data from 22,500 students 
in 452 schools. He found that 68% of Grade 10 students were 
receiving tutoring. 
Pakistan Private tutoring is very common in urban areas (Mulji 2003), and 
also widespread in rural areas (ASER-Pakistan 2011). Concerning 
the latter, a 2010 survey of 19,006 households found that only 
80% of children attended school. Among those who did attend 
school, 14.3% received private tutoring (ASER-Pakistan 2011: 52). 
Philippines De Castro and de Guzman (2010) surveyed 1,235 students in 
23 schools. They found that 40.7% of grade 6 students and 46.5% 
of grade 10 students received tutoring. 
Box 1 continued
continued on next page
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Singapore Tan (2009) lamented the dearth of carefully collected empirical 
data on tutoring, but noted that the phenomenon had been very 
visible for some decades, citing the work of Kwan-Terry (1991) 
and George (1992). A 2008 newspaper report stated that 97% of 
students polled at the primary, middle, and senior secondary levels 
were receiving tutoring (Toh 2008).
Sri Lanka Pallegedara (2011:9) examined 2006/07 survey data of 11,628 
households with 21,438 students aged 6–21. Among these 
households, 63.7% had spent money on private tutoring. This 
compared with just 23.3% in a comparable survey in 1995/96. 
Suraweera (2011:20) reported that 92.4% of 2,578 students in 
a grade 10 survey and 98.0% of 884 grade 12 students were 
receiving tutoring.
Taipei,China The education panel survey conducted in Taipei,China in 2001 
covered 20,000 high school students and indicated that 72.9% 
of grade 7 students were receiving tutoring for an average of 
6.5 hours per week (Liu 2012).
Tajikistan Kodirov and Amonov (2009) asked 999 first year university students 
about their experiences in the last year of secondary schooling. 
They found that 64.8% of students had received tutoring (private 
lessons, preparatory courses, or both).
Thailand The Nation, a national newspaper (Editorial 2011), noted the lack 
of official statistics but stated that cram schools had proliferated 
and were consuming fees of 7 billion baht (US$233 million). 
Turkmenistan Clement (2006, quoted by Silova 2009a:59) indicated that, 
since the country’s independence in 1991, an extensive shadow 
education system had emerged. It consisted of unregistered classes 
in teachers’ homes and elsewhere, and involved the majority of 
teachers. 
Uzbekistan Silova (2009a) did not provide numerical estimates but indicated 
that levels of tutoring were comparable with those in other parts 
of Central Asia. 
Viet Nam Dang (2011b) reviewed 2006 survey data from 9,189 households. 
He found that 32.0% of primary students were receiving tutoring. 
In lower and upper secondary, respective proportions were 46.0% 
and 63.0%.
Box 1 continued
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If Box 1 were presented in geographic clusters rather than alphabetically, 
some broad patterns would emerge. The principal ones are as follows:
•	 East Asia, including Japan, Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China, 
has long traditions of private tutoring and is the part of the world 
in which it has been most visible. This can be linked to Confucian 
traditions, which value educational achievement and see educational 
qualifications as a major route to personal and family advancement. 
In the PRC, for some decades the Confucian heritage did not lead 
to private tutoring, because the Communist government strictly 
prohibited private enterprise. However, with the advent of the market 
economy, supported by rising incomes and greater mobility of labor, 
which promotes competition, private tutoring has mushroomed 
(Kwok 2010, Zhang 2011).
•	 South Asia, including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 
also has long traditions of private tutoring. Indeed, official remarks 
about the phenomenon in Sri Lanka go back to 1943 (Box 2). In these 
countries, tutoring is driven partly by social competition but also by 
Box 2 A Longstanding Concern 
The challenges of private tutoring were noted in what is now Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) 
as early as 1943. A Special Committee on Education was particularly critical of the 
examination-oriented coaching centers that operated alongside the schools. The 
committee felt that the emphasis of these centers on rote learning undermined the 
broad purposes of education. The report stated:
Parents frequently provide private coaches whose whole justification is that 
they will get their pupils through examinations. Coaching establishments 
which do not pretend to educate at all, flourish.
We strongly deprecate the practice too frequently adopted by many parents 
of supplementing the school work by private coaching. In the end it destroys 
its object by making the student incapable of originality and initiative.
Since that era, coaching centers and other forms of supplementary tutoring have 
greatly multiplied. The warning signals expressed in 1943 were not strong enough 
to change this emerging feature. On the contrary, coaching has now become deeply 
engrained in the culture.
Source: Report of the Special Committee on Education (1943), Sessional Paper XXIV, Colombo: 
Ceylon Government Press, quoted by Suraweera (2011: 9, 17).
Mapping the Landscape 9
teachers desiring to increase their salaries and seeing their pupils as a 
captive market (Nath 2008, Sujatha and Rani 2011, Suraweera 2011). 
Similar patterns are evident in parts of Southeast Asia, including 
Cambodia (Dawson 2009, Brehm and Silova 2012) and Viet Nam 
(Dang 2008, Ko and Xing 2009).
•	 In Northern, Central, and Western Asia, including Mongolia and the 
states that were part of the former Soviet Union, shadow education has 
expanded to become a vast enterprise (Silova 2009a:69). One major 
force was the collapse in purchasing power of teachers’ salaries after 
the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union. People who remained in the 
teaching profession had to find supplementary earnings to feed their 
families, and tutoring was an obvious route. Society understood the 
pressures on teachers, and accepted the phenomenon. Although the 
purchasing power of teachers’ salaries has since risen in many of these 
countries, the culture of tutoring has remained embedded.
Intensity and Demographic Variations
The figures in Box 1 indicate the proportions of school populations that receive 
private tutoring, but they do not indicate the intensity of their studies. Official 
statistics on school enrollment rates imply that pupils attend school for the 
bulk of the school year. In practice, that assumption may be erroneous; but it is 
more likely to be valid for school enrollments than for supplementary tutoring. 
Some students receive tutoring throughout the year, while others do so mainly 
in the period building up to examinations. For example, among the students in 
the Kyrgyz Republic surveyed by Bagdasarova and Ivanov (2009:132), 40.5% 
received private tutoring lessons regularly throughout the year, 20.0% received 
them occasionally throughout the year, 19.1% received them regularly in the final 
semester, 8.0% received them occasionally in the final semester, and 12.3% did so 
just before examinations. Variations in intensity were also evident in the number 
of hours per week. The majority of students (57.1%) spent 1–2 hours per week 
with a private tutor, while some spent less and others spent more.
Casual observers commonly assume that secondary school students receive 
tutoring more intensively than primary students. There is some validity in this 
statement as a generalization, as supported for example by data from the PRC 
(Xue and Ding 2009). However, much depends on the nature of the selection 
processes at various stages in the education system. In Singapore, the Primary 
School Leaving Examination is a major selection event, since it is the principal 
determinant of the secondary school streams that students will enter. For that 
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reason, the intensity of primary school tutoring in Singapore rivals that of 
secondary school (Tan 2009). Table 1 provides data from the Republic of Korea, 
showing that participation rates are higher in elementary schools than in middle 
and general high schools. This may reflect parental desires to secure a strong 
foundation, but may also reflect the functions of tutoring as a child-minding 
agent. Participation rates in vocational secondary schools were low, because 
students felt that they were already on a non-academic track. 
Table 1 Shadow Education Participation by Region  
and Level of Education, Republic of Korea, 2008 (%)
Region Elementary Middle General High
Vocational 
High
Seoul 89.4 75.9 73.6 21.7
Metro 90.3 74.9 60.1 35.3
City 88.7 73.1 60.7 27.3
Town 79.2 59.8 32.2 35.3
Source: Kim (2010:302).
One might expect pupils in private schools to receive less shadow education 
than their counterparts in public schools, on the grounds that the private schools 
are already more closely attuned to their clients and are already charging fees 
to permit them to meet those clients’ needs. This is indeed the case in some 
countries. Nath (2011a) presented Bangladesh data indicating that 38% of pupils 
in government primary schools received private tutoring compared with 12% in 
nongovernment schools. However, in other settings students in private schools 
seem to receive more tutoring than their counterparts in public schools. One 
explanation is that parents already have disposable income for private schooling, 
and have already demonstrated their willingness to use the market to secure an 
educational edge for their children. Examples of the connection between private 
mainstream schooling and private supplementary tutoring include the following:
•	 India. In rural parts of Uttar Pradesh, 10.1% of grade 1 children in 
private schools in 2010 were receiving tutoring compared with 3.8% 
in government schools (Pratham 2011:214). This disparity was 
maintained in all reported grades, with respective proportions in grade 
8 being 18.9% and 9.0%. In rural West Bengal, where overall levels of 
tutoring were much higher, private schools commenced with higher 
rates in grade 1 (60.7% compared with 50.6% in government schools), 
though in higher grades the balance was reversed, with proportions in 
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grade 8 being 72.9% of children in private schools receiving tutoring 
compared with 83.1% in government schools (Pratham 2011:222). 
These figures may be supplemented by nationwide survey data (India 
2010:A-310; see also Box 3). In 2007/08, reporting students (both 
rural and urban) in private unaided schools were estimated to have 
paid an average of 2,349 rupees for private tutoring compared with 
2,773 rupees for their counterparts in private aided schools and only 
1,456 rupees for students in government schools. 
Box 3 Alarm about the Expansion of Private Tutoring in India 
The Pratichi Trust was established in India by Amartya Sen using resources from 
his 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. The Trust prepared a survey of primary 
education in India’s West Bengal in 2001/02, and repeated the survey 7 years later. 
The initial report showed many shortcomings in the education system. The later 
report showed significant progress in many domains, but also documented growing 
dependence on private tutoring. The study sampled both primary schools and 
Sishu Siksha Kendras (SSKs), which are rural and community-based alternatives to 
primary schools. Sen wrote (2009:13):
There has been a real regression, as opposed to progress, on the dependence 
on private tuition. The proportion of children relying on private tuition has 
gone up quite a bit (64% from 57% for the students of standard primary 
schools, and 58% from 24% for SSK children). Underlying this rise is 
not only some increase in incomes and the affordability of having private 
tuition, but also an intensification of the general conviction among the 
parents that private tuition is “unavoidable” if it can be at all afforded (78% 
of the parents now believe it is indeed “unavoidable” – up from 62%). For 
those who do not have arrangements for private tuition, 54% indicate that 
they do not go for it mainly—or only—because they cannot afford the costs.
Sen noted that most of the content in the private tutorial classes could and should 
have been taught in the regular classes of the primary schools. He added that private 
tutoring (pp.14–15):
divides the student population into haves and have-nots; it makes teachers 
less responsible and it diminishes their central role in education; it makes 
improvements in schooling arrangements more difficult since the more 
influential and better placed families have less at stake in the quality of 
what is done in the schools (thanks to the supplementation outside school 
hours); [and] it effectively negates the basic right of all children to receive  
elementary education. 
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•	 Pakistan. A 2010 survey of 19,006 rural households in 32 districts 
of five provinces found that 25.3% of students aged 6–16 in private 
schools received private supplementary tutoring compared with 9.7% 
in government schools (ASER-Pakistan 2011:52). A repeat survey the 
following year confirmed the general pattern (ASER-Pakistan 2012:1; 
Aslam 2012:24).
Another dimension concerns location. In general, shadow education 
participation rates are greater in urban areas than in rural areas, and greater in 
larger cities than in smaller ones. The Korean data in Table 1 showed relatively 
modest urban/rural differences at the elementary level but marked differences 
among students in general high schools. In the Kyrgyz Republic, 61.9% of 
surveyed students from urban areas reported that they had received tutoring, 
compared with 37.7% of students from rural areas (Silova 2009a:74). 
A further source of variation may be gender. Some studies have indicated 
that when parents have to make decisions on whether to invest in the tutoring 
of boys or girls, they are more likely to choose the former on the grounds that 
boys are more likely to seek paid employment that will require educational 
qualifications. Such gender imbalances have been found at the primary school 
level in Bangladesh (Nath 2008) and at both the primary and secondary levels in 
India (Ghosh and Rana 2011:12; Sujatha and Rani 2011:119). Pro-male bias has 
also been reported in Japan (OECD 2011a:128); Pakistan (Aslam and Atherton 
2011); and Taipei,China (Liu 2012). However, the pattern is not universal. The 
survey in the Kyrgyz Republic by Bagdasarova and Ivanov (2009:134–135) found 
that females comprised 65.4% of enrollments in one-on-one and small group 
tutoring and 67.9% in preparatory courses. Similarly, in the Republic of Korea, 
Kim and Lee (2010) found greater tutoring, expenditures for females than for 
males, while a Bangladesh study of tutoring at the secondary level (Hamid et al. 
2009) did not find any significant differences. The study in Viet Nam by Dang 
(2007) also found no significant gender differences. 
On another variable, some societies show significant racial or ethnic 
variations. Jelani and Tan (2012) looked at patterns of private tutoring received 
by primary school students in Penang, Malaysia. They found that students 
of Chinese ethnicity were more likely to receive tutoring, observing that such 
students formed 38% of the population but 46% of students in their sample. By 
contrast, Malays formed 51% of the population but only 44% of their sample. 
These findings echoed research two decades earlier by Marimuthu et al. (1991), 
when disparities were even more pronounced. Ethnic differences have also been 
reported in Viet Nam (Ha and Harpham 2005, Dang 2007, 2011b) and Sri Lanka 
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(Gunasekara 2009, Pallegedera 2011). However, variations by race and ethnicity 
may reflect economic factors as well as cultural ones.
Subjects and Modes
The subjects most in demand for private supplementary tutoring are those that 
are most necessary for advancement in the education systems. This usually 
includes mathematics, the national language, and an international language such 
as English. In Georgia, among students surveyed by the International Institute of 
Education Policy, Planning and Management who were receiving tutoring, 48% 
did so in mathematics, 23% in the national language, and 78% in foreign languages 
(EPPM 2011:26). Table 2 indicates the subjects taken by grade 10 students in Sri 
Lanka prior to the Ordinary Level examinations, after which the students select 
specializations for the Advanced Level. Similarly, Table 3 indicates the subjects 
received by senior secondary students in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Tajikistan prior to their entrance to university.
Table 2 Subjects in which Grade 10 Students Received  
Private Tutoring, Sri Lanka, 2009
Mathematics Science English Sinhala History Aesthetics
% of Students 
Receiving 
Tutoring
91 73 68 18 13 11
Source: Suraweera (2011: 20).
Table 3 Subjects in which Senior Secondary Students Received 
Private Lessons, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan,  
2005/06 (%)
Country Mathematics Physics History
State
Language
Russian
Language
Foreign
Language
Kazakhstan 33.5 17.9 18.0 8.9  6.1  7.9
Kyrgyz Republic 16.9  2.5  6.3 2.3  6.1 26.1
Tajikistan 12.4  2.5  5.1 8.5 11.1 24.1
Sample Mean
(weighted) 20.9  7.7
 
 9.8 6.5  7.8 19.4
Source: Silova (2009a: 73).
14 Shadow Education
In addition to straightforward repetition of school subjects may be 
elaborations and supplements of various kinds. To attract clients, private tutors 
differentiate themselves from the school sector through their teaching approaches 
and content. They may offer personalized instruction and a tailored curriculum 
on a one-on-one basis. Since one-on-one tutoring is costly for the client, many 
tutors also provide for small groups at lower unit costs (but usually greater overall 
revenue per hour for the tutors). For remedial tutoring they are likely to stay 
within the confines of the school curriculum, but for enrichment tutoring they 
expand the curriculum with additional material. In Japan, more than 50% of 
grades 3–9 respondents in a 2008 Ministry of Education survey stated that they 
liked juku because they learned materials that were not taught in their schools 
(Dawson 2010:18). 
Such tutoring may also alter the sequence of instruction. Thus, although 
the metaphor of the shadow implies that the private tutoring follows the regular 
system, some tutors offer “learning in advance.” This has become a significant 
phenomenon in the Republic of Korea, where some hagwons teach students for 
2 months during the vacation before the beginning of the academic year, and 
during the school year also keep ahead of the school curriculum (Lee et al. 2004, 
Dawson 2010). This creates difficulties for the school teachers, who find that 
some students have already learned the material while others have not. 
In some societies, alongside one-on-one and small-group tutoring are the 
very different formats provided by “star” tutors, who are able to pack lecture 
theaters and operate with overflow video screens. These are a major phenomenon 
in Hong Kong, China, where companies advertise personalities on television, 
in newspapers, and on the backs of buses, and attract significant proportions of 
middle school and senior secondary students (Kwo and Bray 2011). Some students 
just attend the lectures and/or video recordings of the lectures, while others 
purchase add-ons such as personalized interaction with the star tutor or a tutor’s 
aide via Facebook, e-mail, or other modes. In Sri Lanka, “hall tuition classes” may 
even serve 1,000 students at a time. Pallegedera (2011:7) notes that the classes are 
usually held on weekends but sometimes on weekdays, and, since they are offered 
only in large towns, some students from rural areas travel long distances to attend. 
The internet is also increasingly used for other forms of tutoring at a 
distance. Such tutoring may be conducted live, using Skype and other software, 
or it may take the form of self-service lessons. At least one company in the PRC 
earns money by selling a password to sets of prerecorded lessons and exercises, 
some of which can be submitted for grading and personal feedback. Online 
tutoring is not restricted by geographic boundaries: The tutors and their clients 
may be in the same city or they may be in different countries or even continents. 
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Considerable publicity has been given to Indian companies that provide tutoring 
to pupils in England and the US (Blakely 2007, Ventura and Jang 2010). Such 
operations are likely to expand further. Tutor Vista Global, among the most 
visible of these companies, leverages the price differentials across international 
markets. As explained by Vora and Dewan (2009:140), typical tutoring rates in 
the US were around US$100 per hour for face-to-face tutoring and US$40 per 
hour for online tutoring. With Tutor Vista’s offerings, a student opting for 2 hours 
a day and 5 days a week paid only US$2.50 per hour of tutoring. 
Costs
The costs of shadow education may usefully be considered at two levels—one is 
the individual or household level, and the other is the country level. 
In any one area, the costs of tutoring vary considerably according to the 
quality, location, size of tutorial group, nature of premises, and other factors. 
Table 4 shows estimates of tutoring enrollment rates and per-child expenditures 
Table 4 Proportions of Children Aged 3–16 Receiving Private 
Tutoring by Income Quintile, Rural India (2007/08)  
and Rural Pakistan (2010)
Income 
Quintile
Proportion of Children 
Receiving Tutoring
Expenditure on Tutoring  
per Child (Indian/
Pakistani rupees per month)
India
1 = poorest 18.1 68.9
2 20.0 70.4
3 21.1 72.8
4 25.2 75.5
5 = richest 31.8 90.2
Pakistan
1 = poorest  5.5 287
2  9.6 233
3 14.0 241
4 19.9 292
5 = richest 27.6 352
Source: Aslam and Atherton (2011:7).
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in rural India and rural Pakistan. As one might expect, the proportions of 
children receiving tutoring were greater in richer households than in poorer 
ones, and in addition the richer households paid more per child than did the 
poorer households. In Pakistan, expenditures on tutoring per child averaged the 
equivalent of US$3.40 per month. This was a significant amount, given that 60% 
of Pakistan’s population reportedly lived on less than US$2 per day. In India, 
average spending was lower but still equated to about US$2 per month (Aslam 
and Atherton 2011). 
To complement these figures, nationwide survey data in India show 
expenditures on private tutoring by gender. Average expenditures are higher 
for boys than for girls at almost all levels of education and in both urban and 
rural locations. For example, estimated expenditures for boys in urban areas in 
2007/08 were 328 rupees at the primary level compared with 286 rupees for girls 
(India 2010:A-281). At the middle-school level, respective figures were 730 and 
547 rupees; and at the secondary and higher secondary levels, respective figures 
were 1,929 and 1,631 rupees. These figures seemed to reflect chiefly the tendency 
to send more boys than girls for tutoring rather than the unit costs for those who 
did receive tutoring. Data on students who reported some expenditure (excluding 
those who reported no expenditure) showed much smaller gaps (p.A-306).
Elsewhere, household surveys have also shown differences by ethnicity. The 
2004/05 national survey in Malaysia showed that Chinese and Indian households 
spent more on tutoring than did Malay and indigenous households or other 
groups (Table 5). The data show only households with positive expenditures, i.e., 
they omit ones with no expenditures on private tutoring. Since higher proportions 
of Chinese and Indian households had positive expenditures, in absolute terms 
the gap was even wider than is portrayed in the table. 
Ethnicity may of course overlap with social class. Returning to the issue 
of socioeconomic groups, Table 6 presents statistics from the Republic of Korea. 
Again, families in higher income groups consumed more private tutoring, which 
translated into greater expenditures. In proportional terms, even students in 
vocational high schools received more tutoring and greater expenditures when 
they were from higher income families. Gaps between high-income and low-
income families appeared to have increased over the decade (Byun 2011).
Research elsewhere has shed further light on the balance between 
household costs of tutoring and costs of other items related to education. 
Table 7 presents figures on secondary schooling in Bangladesh. For students in 
government schools, an average of 41.9% of the total household cost of education 
was consumed by private tutoring; for students in subsidized nongovernment 
schools, the proportion was 29.2%. 
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Pallegedara (2011:24) has shown expenditures in Sri Lanka rising over 
time. Referring to national household surveys, Pallegedara noted that in 1995/96, 
23.3% of households with school-aged children spent money on private tutoring, 
and 14.8% of households allocated 1%–5% of total household expenditure for 
tutoring. In 2006/07, 64.0% of households spent money on private tutoring, and 
24.0% allocated 1%–5% of total household expenditure for tutoring. Moreover, 
some households spent even more. In 2006/07, 2.7% of households allocated 
between 5% and 10% of their total expenditures for private tutoring, and 0.9% 
allocated more than 10%. 
To supplement these numbers, Table 8 shows yearly costs of private 
tutoring in three countries of Central Asia. The costs of tutoring on a one-on-one 
or small-group basis are naturally higher than the costs of tutoring in courses 
with larger class sizes. Nevertheless, even the latter figures were substantial. In 
Tajikistan, for example, the mean for tutoring classes in just one subject (and 
thus proportionately more for additional subjects) was equivalent to 1.98% of per 
capita gross domestic product. 
From such household figures, one may compute national expenditure 
figures. Again, the figures for the Republic of Korea are especially notable. 
Expenditures are also significant in many other societies: 
Table 7 Household Costs for Secondary Schooling, Bangladesh, 2005
Expenditure Item
Government Schools Nongovernment Schools
Taka % Taka %
Private Tutoring 4,700 41.9 2,210 29.2
Books 796 7.1 686 9.0
Stationery 1,099 9.8 992 13.1
Electricity and Kerosene 461 4.1 709 9.4
Snacks 804 7.2 751 9.9
Health Service 591 5.3 471 6.2
Uniforms 515 4.6 410 5.4
Transport 833 7.4 315 4.2
Others 1,405 12.5 1,030 13.6
Total 11,204 100.0 7,574 100.0
Note: Government secondary schools are fully funded by the government. Nongovernment schools, 
as classified here, are not private schools, because they are substantially funded by the government in 
the form of teachers’ salaries and school infrastructure. 
Source: Campaign for Popular Education (2007:51).
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•	 Georgia: Household expenditures on tutoring at the secondary level 
consumed 120 million lari (US$48 million) in 2011, which was 
equivalent to 34.2% of public expenditure on secondary education 
(EPPM 2011: 29). 
•	 Hong Kong, China: A 2010 survey of businesses serving secondary 
students following the local curriculum, i.e., excluding primary 
students, one-on-one private tutoring services, and businesses 
serving students in international schools (Synovate Limited 2011), 
indicated that the market size was approximately HK$1,984 million 
(US$255 million). 
•	 India. Rana et al. (2005:1552) estimated the costs of private tutoring in 
government primary schools in West Bengal at 21.5% of the total costs 
of educating a child. Nationally, a 2008 market survey of companies 
offering coaching estimated the size of the sector at US$6.4 billion and 
predicted annual growth of 15% over the subsequent 4 years (Vora and 
Dewan 2009:60). The survey, concerned mainly with large companies, 
highlighted 14 “key players.” To the operations of these companies 
should be added a huge number of informal and semiformal providers 
of tutoring.
Table 8 Yearly Costs per Person for Private Tutoring, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan
Country
 Median Mean 
Costs of 
One-on-
One or 
Small-
Group 
Lessons 
in One 
Subject 
(US$) 
Costs of 
Tutoring 
Classes 
in One 
Subject 
(US$)
Costs of 
Tutoring 
Classes as 
% of GDP 
per Capita 
(PPP US$)
Costs of 
One-on-
One or 
Small-
Group 
Lessons 
in One 
Subject 
(US$)
Costs of 
Tutoring 
Classes 
in One 
Subject 
(US$)
Costs of 
Tutoring 
Classes as 
% of GDP 
per Capita 
(PPP US$)
Kazakhstan 100.0 30.0  0.38 212.6 72.9 0.94
Kyrgyz Republic 36.3 24.2 1.21 63.8 35.9 1.80
Tajikistan 31.3  6.3 0.44 76.4 28.1 1.98
GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity. 
Note: Private tutoring costs were converted from local currencies into US$ using the exchange rate at 
the time of data collection (2006). Because of the wide spread of data and the existence of significant 
anomalous outliers, median calculations are used in addition to means to compare expenditures in 
the countries.
Source: Calculated from Silova (2009a:76–77).
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•	 Japan. Households in Japan were reported in 2010 to be spending 
about 924 billion yen (US$12 billion) (Dawson 2010:16) on 
private tutoring. 
•	 Republic of Korea. In 2006, expenditure on private tutoring was 
equivalent to about 80% of government expenditure on public 
education for primary and secondary students (Kim and Lee 
2010:261). Shadow education expenditures rose every year from 1998 
to 2009, beginning to reduce slightly only in 2010 (Figure 1). In that 
year, expenditures reached 20.8 trillion won (US$17.3 billion). 
•	 Singapore: Households spent about S$820 million (US$680 million) on 
center and home-based private tutoring in 2008. This was an increase 
from S$470 million a decade earlier (Basu 2010:D2).
Figure 1 Average Monthly Household Expenditures  
on Shadow Education, Republic of Korea, 1997–2010
Sources: Jang (2011:2), Korea National Statistical Office (2011: 2).
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Box 4 Dazzling Work Ethic, Gritty Faith, and Financial Realities  
in Viet Nam
Dao Ngoc Phung is a 14-year-old girl in a remote part of Viet Nam. She is tiny, 
standing just 4 feet 11 inches; yet Phung is also breathtakingly strong. Phung is so 
obsessed with schoolwork that she sets her alarm for 3 am each day. She rises quietly 
so as not to wake her younger brother and sister, who both share her bed, and she 
then cooks rice for breakfast while reviewing her books. 
The children’s mother died a year ago, leaving the family with the equivalent of 
US$1,500 in debts. Their father, a carpenter named Dao Van Hiep, loves his children 
and is desperate for them to get an education, but he has taken city jobs so that he 
can reduce the debt. Therefore, during the week Phung is like a single mother who 
happens to be in the ninth grade. 
Phung wakes her brother and sister, and then after breakfast they all go off 
to school. For Phung, that means a 90-minute bicycle ride each way. She arrives at 
school 20 minutes early to be sure she’s not late. 
After school, the three children go fishing to get something to eat. Phung 
reserves unpleasant chores, like cleaning the toilet, for herself, but she does not 
hesitate to discipline her younger brother, Tien, 9, or sister, Huong, 12. When Tien 
disobeyed her by hanging out with some bad boys, she thrashed him with a stick. 
Most of the time, though, she’s gentle, especially when Tien misses his mother. 
“I try to comfort him,” she says, “but then all three of us end up crying.” 
Phung yearns to attend university and become an accountant. It’s an almost 
impossible dream for a village girl, but across East Asia the poor often compensate for 
lack of money with a dazzling work ethic and gritty faith that education can change 
destinies. The obsession with schooling is a legacy of Confucianism—a 2,500-year-
old tradition of respect for teachers, scholarship, and meritocratic exams. That’s one 
reason Confucian countries like People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and 
Viet Nam are among the world’s star performers in the war on poverty. 
Phung pleads with her father to pay for extra tutoring in math and English. 
He explains softly that the cost—$40 a year—is unaffordable. Phung continues 
undaunted. But lack of money for tutoring when almost everyone else seems to 
receive it is one more obstacle to her long-term dream.
Source: Adapted from Kristof (2011).
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Demand and Supply
This chapter commences by reviewing major drivers of demand for tutoring. It 
gives particular attention to transition points in education systems, cultural traits, 
various factors related to the internal operation of schools, and the combination 
of smaller families and increased wealth. The chapter then turns to the supply 
of tutoring, again noting that providers of tutoring may range from informal 
operations involving single individuals to large multinational companies.
Drivers of Demand
The main driver of demand for supplementary tutoring is awareness that 
investment in education can generate strong returns from good performance in 
key examinations and entrance to high-status secondary schools and universities. 
Few parents have read the empirical literature on rates of return to education 
(Barro and Lee 2010, Kara 2010, Son 2010); but most have a strong—and to 
some extent valid—impression that the longer a person can stay in the education 
system, and the better the quality of that education, the greater the prospects 
for enhanced lifetime earnings and standard of living. By corollary, families 
know that poor performance in school and on examinations is related to weaker 
employment opportunities and lower standards of living.
Transition points in education systems
Although all education systems in Asia have greatly expanded in recent decades, 
not all have universal lower secondary education, and even fewer have universal 
upper secondary education. At the transition points between levels, decisions 
must be made by schools and higher level administrators about who will be 
permitted to proceed in the education system and who will be pushed out. 
Families that do not wish their children to be pushed out may invest in private 
supplementary tutoring to secure an edge in the competition. 
Competition may also be strong in systems that do have universal lower 
and upper secondary education. Singapore, for example, has a highly stratified 
system of secondary schooling (Singapore 2011). After the basic 6 years of 
primary schooling, students are streamed into
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•	 an integrated program of 4–6 years, which combines secondary and 
junior college education without an intermediate examination;
•	 a secondary express program of 4 years;
•	 a secondary normal program (academic) of 5 years;
•	 a secondary normal program (technical) of 4 years; or
•	 a prevocational program of 1–4 years.
The implications of each track for future careers are very significant, and since 
the Primary School Leaving Examination is a major determinant of the tracks 
in which students will find themselves, many parents invest in supplementary 
tutoring at the primary level. 
In other systems, the major push-out stage is at the end of senior 
secondary education. Some systems have great pressure at that stage, because few 
postsecondary places are available, and the gate is therefore narrow. Observers 
commonly assume that if the gate is widened through expansion of postsecondary 
intakes, then pressures for private supplementary tutoring will ease. This does 
indeed happen in some systems, but it is not a universal pattern. Instead, the 
question for families changes from “postsecondary place or no postsecondary 
place?” to “which postsecondary place?” If postsecondary institutions and 
programs remain highly stratified, with some offering much greater rewards 
than others, then demand for private supplementary tutoring during the years of 
secondary schooling is likely to remain intense. Indeed, the case of Hong Kong, 
China shows that expansion of postsecondary education can even increase 
demand for supplementary tutoring. In the 1980s, when local postsecondary 
places were available for only about 4% of an age cohort, most families assumed 
that postsecondary education was out of reach. Twenty years later, postsecondary 
education had expanded to serve 60% of a cohort, and families therefore not only 
saw it as within reach but also sought the more desirable parts of the system, 
which could be obtained with the help of supplementary tutoring.
Similar patterns have been observed elsewhere in East Asia. In Japan, the 
falling birth rate has made tertiary education accessible to virtually all secondary 
graduates who wish to attend; yet the proportion of middle school students 
attending juku rose from 44% in 1985 to 53% in 2007 (OECD 2011a:112). And 
in Taipei,China the number of universities and colleges expanded from 105 in 
1999 to 162 in 2008, but the number of registered wen-li buxiban (literature 
and science cram schools) expanded from 1,844 to 9,344 (Kuan 2011:343). 
Government reforms in Taipei,China aimed to discourage narrow and passive 
learning habits by opening new pathways and diversifying the education system. 
However, rather than decreasing demand for cram schools, these reforms simply 
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diversified it—to increase their chances of admission, students now seek cram 
schools in both academic subjects and non-academic subjects (Liu 2012:47).
In other locations, moreover, families note that investment in tutoring 
at the secondary level can pay dividends in the form of a scholarship at the 
postsecondary level (Silova 2009c:68). It is thus a case of “pay now to save later”—
or, for those who do not invest in tutoring but who do gain a postsecondary place 
without a scholarship, “save now but pay later.” 
Culture
Broad cultural factors are often brought into discussions to explain why private 
tutoring has been stronger in some parts of the world than in others. The 
influence of Confucianism is often cited in East and Southeast Asia (Kwok 2001, 
Huang 2004, Lei 2005, Dang 2008, Kuan 2011), and may be extended to Chinese 
immigrant communities in the US and elsewhere (Box 5). Such commentaries no 
doubt have some validity, though cultures have always been mediated by other 
factors and are now increasingly shaped by the forces of globalization. 
Other parts of Asia have cultures shaped by post-Soviet legacies. Private 
tutoring existed in the former Soviet Union (Hrynevych et al. 2006:305; UNDP 
Box 5 Culture and the Tiger Mothers
Amy Chua, a Chinese American, became an international celebrity after the 
publication of her 2011 book Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother. Her revealing narrative 
attributed the educational success of her two daughters to the strict, demanding 
expectations of “Chinese” parenting. It also chronicled, if only partly, the emotional 
and physical demands of the high hopes and expectations that tiger parents have for 
their children.
In the months following the book’s publication, stories poured in from other 
tiger mothers, including Rosalind Corlin in Hong Kong, China, who woke her twin 
10-year-olds at 5:30 am every day for a regimen of academic and non-academic 
private tutoring: mathematics lessons from an Oxford-trained mathematics genius; 
swimming lessons with the former Singaporean national swimming team coach; 
chess lessons with the Finnish national chess coach; and language lessons in French, 
English, and Chinese (South China Morning Post, 21 January 2011).
This intense parenting reflects the competitive nature of the educational process 
and the deep-seated anxiety parents have over their children’s education. Private 
tutors are one of the beneficiaries of this anxiety, turning the ambitions of tiger 
parents into a steady stream of revenue.
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2007:64; Kalikova and Rakhimzhanova 2009:93) but was downplayed by the 
authorities, who wished to preserve the image of a fee-free and egalitarian 
education system in line with the socialist ideal. As noted by Silova (2009b:35), 
the post-Soviet era brought “new socio-cultural realities of new democracies 
and market economies,” which required increasing reliance on private tutoring. 
It became acceptable for teachers to treat their human capital as personal 
knowledge that could be purchased in the way that other knowledge and skills 
could be purchased. 
The cultures of South Asia display further differences. Sri Lanka, for example, 
has deeply engrained traditions of private tutoring that have been passed down for 
several generations. Detailed research dates from the 1980s (Pararajasinghham 
1980, cited in de Silva 1994; Hemachandra 1982; Manchanayake and Nanayakkara 
1986, cited in Nanayakkara and Ranaweera 1994; de Silva et al. 1991), but public 
commentary dates at least from the 1940s (Suraweera 2011; see Box 2). As such, 
it can be argued that private tutoring has entered the general culture insofar as 
it is seen as a normal part of daily life not only for contemporary children but 
also for their parents and perhaps even grandparents. Pallegedara (2011:16), 
using empirical data from national household surveys to calculate the elasticity of 
demand, showed that in 1995/96 private tutoring was generally viewed as a luxury, 
but by 2006/07 it was generally viewed as a necessity.
School Quality
Perceptions of inadequacies in mainstream schooling are another major driver 
of private tutoring. Table 9 reports the responses by 2,378 grade 10 students in 
Sri Lanka when asked why they sought private tutoring. More than half (53%) 
stated that they had not received sufficient exercises in school, and that the full 
syllabus content had not been covered; 50% indicated that they had difficulty in 
understanding what was taught in school. 
Similar perspectives are also evident elsewhere in South Asia. In 
Bangladesh the point was made forcefully by one student reported by Hamid 
et al. (2009:298): “Private tutoring is needed because of the failure of school in 
English teaching. If English was taught properly at school, there would not be any 
need to take private lessons.” In some cases, this is not so much because of poor 
quality teaching but because of no teaching at all. In India’s West Bengal, Sen 
(2010) noted that teachers often fail to come to school, since they do not perceive 
a likelihood of sanction for such behavior (see also Chakraborty 2003). Such 
teachers are more likely to attend their tutoring classes, however, because there 
is a direct correlation between effort and income. When mainstream schools are 
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unprepared to give even hard-working and talented students the opportunity of 
learning the relevant materials, families invest in private tutoring not just to gain 
an extra edge but to cover basic skills and concepts. 
Turning to a different region, comparable dissatisfaction has been 
demonstrated in several parts of the former Soviet Union. In Azerbaijan, Silova 
and Kazimzade (2006) surveyed 1,019 secondary students and 913 first year 
university students and found that 52.7% and 59.5%, respectively, believed that 
private tutoring was “the only way to get a high-quality education” (p. 127). 
A parallel study in Georgia by Matiashvili and Kutateladze (2006) surveyed 
500 secondary students, among whom 48% agreed that “low quality of teaching 
in schools is the main reason for deciding to take private tutoring,” and 41% 
agreed that “students use private tutoring because teachers do not explain subject 
matter thoroughly” (pp. 202–203). These responses were echoed by a 2011 study 
in Georgia (EPPM 2011:28). Along the same lines, in Armenia only 11.9% of 
secondary school graduates surveyed felt that “school knowledge is sufficient” for 
admission to a higher education institution (UNDP 2007:45). 
In some settings, class size is also an issue. Even in wealthy parts of Asia, 
classes commonly have 40 students, and in poorer parts many classes are much 
larger. While the educational consequences of class size are subject to some 
controversy (see, e.g., Wössmann and West 2006, Blatchford et al. 2011), parents 
usually perceive smaller classes as better. Small classes may allow teachers to 
Table 9 Reasons for Receiving Private Tutoring, Sri Lanka, 2009 
Rank Reasons %
1. Discuss examination questions and answers in tutoring classes 68
2. Sufficient exercises not given in school 53
3. Full syllabus subject content not covered in school 53
4. Difficult to understand what is taught in school 50
5. Instructions given in tutoring class on how to answer questions 29
6. To cover the lost work in school as a result of engaging in 
extracurricular activities
23
7. To comply with the wish of the parents 10
8. To enjoy fun in tutoring class 7
9. To avoid losing the favor of the school teacher when he or she 
takes the tutoring class
6
10. Because other classmates attend tutoring 3
Source: Suraweera (2011: 20–21).
28 Shadow Education
engage in more interactive pedagogy, giving students more opportunity to ask 
questions and gain clarifications. If mainstream classes remain large, families 
may decide that tutoring is the only way to secure individualized instruction. 
However, large classes are also found in private tutoring centers: The classes taught 
by master tutors in Sri Lanka and by star tutors in Hong Kong, China commonly 
have more than 100 students. Much therefore depends on perceptions by the 
clients of what they will be able to gain from whom and in what circumstances. 
Related to class size in some settings are double-shift schools in which 
one group of pupils attends in the morning and another group in the afternoon. 
Double-shift schools are common in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and India. Even 
diligent teachers encounter difficulties in covering the full curriculum in half-
day schools, and parents may feel the need for private tutoring to bridge the gap 
(Bray 2008:48). In Viet Nam, this is implicitly recognized by the government, 
which officially prohibits teachers from giving extra private tutoring to students 
with a full-day curriculum (Dang 2011a) but in effect condones it for students in 
double-shift schools. Ko and Xing (2009:23) indicated that children in Viet Nam 
with lower self-reported school quality were more likely to attend extra classes, 
and Ha and Harpham (2005) explicitly highlighted the challenges arising from 
a combination of half-day schooling and a more demanding curriculum. In the 
Maldives, a government decision in 2009 to phase out double-shift schooling 
was motivated partly by a desire to reduce the scale of private tutoring (Sheryn 
2011:79–80).
Smaller Families and Increased Wealth
In most parts of Asia, family size is decreasing. De Castro and de Guzman 
(2010:49) indicated that in the Philippines the amount of shadow education was 
inversely correlated with family size, i.e., that children with fewer siblings received 
more tutoring than children with more siblings. In a related vein, Table 10 presents 
findings from a survey of 40,883 parents that investigated reasons for the “heating 
up” of juku attendance in Japan. More than one-third (38.6%) of parents indicated 
that the increasing number of one-child families was a factor. Parents concentrate 
their resources on the only child and may feel that, with only one child, they cannot 
afford to make errors. Dang and Rogers (2009) found that decreasing family size 
was also a factor in increasing demand for tutoring in Viet Nam. Their observation 
was echoed by Liu (2012:47) with reference to Taipei,China.
Kohli et al. (2011:36) pointed out that the middle class in both the PRC 
and India is “about to take off ” (see also Yuan et al. 2011). The size of families 
in the PRC has been restricted by regulation, while the size of families in India 
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has fallen as the middle class has expanded. At the end of the first decade of the 
21st century, India still had a tiny middle class by global standards; but, reported 
Kohli et al. (p.36), “if the economy continues its growth, 70% of the population 
will be middle class within 15 years.” When it becomes so, household resources 
will combine with aspirations for a smaller number of children and anxiety about 
ways to stay ahead in a global economy. This could offer all the ingredients for a 
dramatic expansion of shadow education. 
Diversity of Supply
Private tutoring is supplied by a diverse range of providers, from neighbors, older 
students, and family members to classroom teachers, global franchises, and web-
based firms. Due partly to its low barriers to entry, the private tutoring industry 
has emerged as a major provider of employment. In the Republic of Korea, the 
number of private tutors expanded roughly 7.1% annually on average from 2001 
to 2006, and by 2009 the sector was the largest employer of graduates from the 
humanities and social sciences (Kim and Park 2012). 
In many countries, the pattern of classroom teachers supplementing their 
incomes by tutoring students after school hours is more a necessity than a choice—
at least as perceived by the teachers themselves—since teachers’ salaries hover 
close to the poverty line. This has been observed in Cambodia (Dawson 2009:64), 
Georgia (EPPM 2011:27), Kazakhstan (Kalikova and Rakhimzhanova 2009:112), 
Lao PDR (Benveniste et al. 2008:105), and Tajikistan (Kodirov and Amonov 
2009:159). In Sri Lanka, the monthly wage of a graduate government teacher in 
2007 ranged from 12,000 to 15,000 rupees (US$108–135), but a teacher could 
earn up to 1,100 rupees an hour from tutoring. One teacher observed, “What 
I get a month from my government job can be earned in 3 or 4 days of tuition” 
Table 10 Factors that Contributed to “Heating up”  
of Juku Attendance, Japan (Parents’ Response Rates)
Factor %
Insecurity only sending children to school to study 66.5
A society that places emphasis on academic credentials 59.9
Increases in educational investment per child due to the decreasing 
birth rate
38.6
Diversification of services in the private education sector 14.5
Source: Japan (2008) cited in Dawson (2010:17). 
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(Samath 2007). The need to take on outside work reduces the time available for 
student mentoring, lesson planning, and professional development activities. 
Concerning commercial approaches, the franchise model of tutoring has 
taken hold in several countries. Kumon, for example, which describes itself as 
“the world’s largest after-school math and reading enrichment program” (Kumon 
2012), is headquartered in Japan and operates in 46 countries including the PRC, 
India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. Kip McGrath, which is headquartered in Australia, 
had franchises in 20 countries in 2012 including Indonesia and Singapore 
(Kip McGrath 2012). 
Other companies may be mainly domestic in focus but still operate as chain 
stores with multiple locations. In Hong Kong, China, from 2005/06 to 2009/10, 
the number of such chain outlets grew from 38 to 106 (Modern Education Group 
2011:93). These outlets claimed 54% of total secondary tutoring capacity, with 
over half of this capacity provided by six companies, one of which became publicly 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2011. In India, Everonn is listed on 
the Bombay Stock Exchange, and in 2011 served eight million students through 
10,100 learning centers (Everonn 2012). In the PRC, Xueda, established in 2004, 
became a listed company on the New York Stock Exchange in 2010. In 2011, the 
company operated 273 learning centers, which employed 11,300 teachers in 28 of 
the PRC’s 34 provinces and municipalities (Xueda 2012). 
Some of these companies run schools and other enterprises in addition 
to providing private tutoring. For example, Beacon College in Hong Kong, 
China provides tutoring mainly for secondary students but also runs a full-time 
institution. In India, Educomp operates 800 preschools and 56 primary and 
secondary schools in addition to providing tutoring in academic subjects and 
training in information technology. 
Figure 2 portrays the different types of shadow education in the Republic 
of Korea, indicating variations at the primary, lower secondary, and upper 
secondary levels. Teachers in this country are prohibited from tutoring their own 
students, and commercial operations dominate. Overall, nearly half of Korean 
students attended cram schools focused mainly on rote learning and preparation 
for examinations, 10% received individual tutoring, 12% received group tutoring, 
19% took correspondence courses, and 4% studied by internet (Byun 2011:6–7). 
One celebrity tutor, Woo Hyeong-cheol, reportedly earned US$3.9 million per 
year on average as a mathematics tutor offering web-based classes to 50,000 
paying students; and Rose Lee, “The Queen of English,” reported an income 
averaging US$6.8 million per year based on earnings through online classes 
(Herskovitz and Kim 2009).
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To some extent, supply is not just a response to demand—supply creates 
demand. As more providers emerge and more students enroll, it can become 
increasingly difficult to keep up with the examination tips and tricks learned by 
one’s classmates. Students who would not have otherwise sought tutoring may 
now do so in order not to be at a competitive disadvantage. In the PRC, Republic 
of Korea, and Thailand, companies stoke student and parent anxiety through 
aggressive advertising in newspapers and on buses and billboards. Similar 
pressures exist when smaller operations offer their services and when teachers 
provide extra tutoring for their students.
Figure 2 Different Forms of Shadow Education  
in the Republic of Korea, 2010
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Source: Korea National Statistical Office, cited in Byun (2011:26).
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Impact of Shadow Education
Shadow education has many types of impact. The most obvious, with which this 
chapter commences, is in academic achievement. In addition, shadow education 
may shape broader skills and the values of both recipients and wider societies. It 
may have an impact on the efficiency of education systems; and it has considerable 
implications for inequalities and perhaps also for social cohesion. Each of these 
dimensions is considered in turn.
Academic Achievement
Many people assume that shadow education delivers positive results in academic 
achievement, reasoning that otherwise families would not invest in it. However, 
that assumption may not always be sound. Much depends on both the quality of 
the tutoring and the abilities and motivation of the learners. Some tutors have 
excellent skills but work with students who are unmotivated or not academically 
capable. By corollary, some students are motivated and capable, but their tutors 
lack content knowledge and pedagogical skills. Families may continue to invest 
in tutoring even when learning gains are elusive. When students do not make 
progress, tutors commonly blame the students rather than themselves, and 
families may accept this diagnosis and continue to invest. Alternatively, students 
may continue to seek tutoring chiefly because most of their classmates seem to 
be doing so. 
Research on this theme encounters difficulties arising from the many 
types of tutoring and the wide range of overlapping variables that also shape 
learning achievement. Nevertheless, some studies are available and can usefully 
be summarized. First is a pair of studies in Bangladesh: Nath (2008:65), using 
data from a 1998 national survey, indicated that 49.6% of pupils aged 11–12 
who had received private tutoring met the benchmark criteria of having a basic 
education, while only 27.5% of students without tutoring met the benchmark; 
and Hamid et al. (2009:293), reporting on a survey of 228 grade 10 students in 
eight rural schools, found that students who had received private lessons had 
double the chance of attaining higher grades than their counterparts who had not 
received private lessons. However, these studies showed correlations rather than 
causations. Thus, it was not clear that students achieved at higher levels because of 
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the tutoring. Rather, they may have been self-selected high achievers who would 
have done well anyway. 
With this consideration in mind, the study of mathematics achievement of 
10,013 grade 9 students in Taipei,China by Kuan (2011) seems more useful. Kuan 
accessed a pair of data sets that allowed him to control for students’ socioeconomic 
status, ability, and attitude. He found that students who had received tutoring 
were on average more studious, higher achieving, and from higher social classes. 
As one might expect, Kuan found that gains were greater among students who 
were motivated, but in both groups the gains were small (p.362). Yet a major 
weakness of Kuan’s study was that all types of tutoring, i.e., both one-on-one and 
large classes, were merged into a single variable. His data were also limited to a 
single semester of grade 9, preventing inferences concerning long-term effects 
or effects for other grade levels (p.353). Further, his paper made no distinctions 
among levels of intensity of tutoring.
A related study by Liu (2012) used part of the same database in Taipei,China. 
Liu analyzed a sample of 13,978 grade 7 students, and did include data on the 
number of hours of tutoring per week. After controlling for other variables, Liu 
found significant positive effects of tutoring on analytical ability and mathematics 
performance, but noted that the positive effects decreased when tutoring hours 
were lengthened. Again, however, Liu lacked information on the impact of 
different types of tutoring.
Other data are available from the Republic of Korea: Sohn et al. (2010: 
26–27) summarized 11 studies using a number of variables. Among six studies 
that examined relationships between expenditures and academic performance, 
five showed positive correlations. However, in at least one case, the relationship 
disappeared once controls were added for student background. The collection of 
studies also showed variations in different subjects and in different grades. Sohn 
et al. then reported on their own study, which included data on the duration of 
tutoring for each student. They did find a positive correlation, though cautioned 
that all types of tutoring had been aggregated.
A similar study was conducted by Byun (2011) in the Republic of Korea. 
Byun used propensity score matching to compare the effect of tutoring on 
academic achievement in mathematics for a nationally representative sample of 
lower secondary students. He found that cram schooling, which focuses primarily 
on test preparation, made a small difference in achievement gains. However, 
other forms of tutoring (such as one-to-one, internet, and correspondence) made 
little difference. To some extent, this echoed the findings of Kang (2009), who 
also found positive but small effects from investment in tutoring as measured by 
the experience of 1,752 students tracked by a Korean Education and Employment 
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Panel longitudinal study. Nevertheless, Byun recognized (p.21) that his study 
focused only on the quantities of the different types of tutoring received and had 
no measures of quality. 
Other studies on this theme include the following: 
•	 PRC. Zhang (2011) examined the relationship between private 
tutoring and performance in the High School Entrance Examination 
in 25 schools in Jinan, Shandong Province. She found a positive 
correlation between tutoring and achievement for low-performing 
urban students but a negative correlation for rural students who were 
not at the top. 
•	 Georgia. The National Examinations Centre examined the impact 
of private tutoring on the scores in the ability test of the national 
examinations. During control testing in 2008, grade 12 students 
who took the standardized ability test were asked whether they were 
receiving (Group I), would receive (Group II), or would not receive 
(Group III) private tutoring classes in the ability domain. The same 
students were identified after the main testing during the 2009 
national examinations. The researchers found that Group III showed 
more progress in main testing than Groups II and I. This suggested 
an insignificant correlation between private tutoring and progress in 
achievement score in the ability test (Bakhutashvili 2011). The findings 
could be explained by the nature of the domain assessed by the ability 
test, which required many years of training in different subjects, 
depended on diverse life experiences, and could not be improved in a 
short period of time.
•	 India. Aslam and Atherton (2011) analyzed data from the 2007/08 
SchoolTells survey in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The survey focused on 
4,000 students in grades 2 and 4 in 160 rural primary schools. Children 
who had received tutoring achieved gains in both mathematics and 
reading, with gains being greater in government than in private 
schools. 
•	 Japan. OECD (2011a:129) noted a positive correlation between 
test scores and expenditures on after-school lessons as indicated by 
the 2009 PISA assessment. The share of correct answers rose by 25 
percentage points as spending increased from below 2,000 yen per 
month to 9,000–10,000 yen. 
•	 Malaysia. Tan (2011) asked 1,600 year 7 students in eight schools 
in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur about their tutoring experiences 
during their primary school years and correlated their responses with 
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academic achievement. The study indicated (p.80) that tutoring in the 
3 years prior to grade 6 had a positive impact, but that earlier tutoring 
was associated with poorer results.
•	 Nepal. Examining correlations between receipt of tutoring and 
scores of 22,500 students on the grade 10 School Leaving Certificate 
examination, Thapa (2011:111) found that students in public schools 
who had received tutoring had higher scores by 1.74 percentage 
points. However, no significant difference was found for students in 
private schools. 
•	 Pakistan. Data from the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER-
Pakistan 2011), which surveyed children of primary school age in 
19,006 rural households, were analyzed by Aslam and Atherton 
(2011). Both poor and rich children were shown to benefit from 
private tutoring. Findings were especially marked in reading scores, 
but less dramatic in mathematics.
•	 Singapore. Cheo and Quah (2005) investigated the learning 
achievements of 429 grade 8 “express” students in three premier 
secondary schools. They found that, although private tutoring can 
have a positive influence on the subject in which that tutoring is 
received, time taken away from other subjects may lead to a decline 
in overall academic performance. They concluded (pp.280–281) that 
the conventional wisdom of “the more the better” in terms of tutoring 
does not match reality, and that diminishing returns set in rapidly 
when “over-investment in the child” takes place. 
•	 Sri Lanka. At the end of senior secondary education, students 
commonly abandon their schools in order to focus on cramming for 
examinations in tutoring centers. Gunasekara (2009) examined some 
implications of this phenomenon, and remarked (p.56) that “private 
tuition contributes more to the achievement of creditable success 
in examinations than school education,” and consequently that 
confidence in school education had been eroded.
•	 Viet Nam. Dang (2007) analyzed 1997/98 national household 
survey data. He found positive correlations between tutoring and 
achievement but noted (p.696) that “the impact is much stronger 
at the lower secondary level compared to the primary level, except 
for the poor performance category.” Ha and Harpham (2005:631) 
analyzed data from 1,000 eight-year-old children randomly selected 
from 4,716 households in 2002. They found that, after controlling for 
region, household wealth, ethnicity, and other factors, receipt of extra 
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classes was not significantly associated with writing and numeracy, 
but that children who had received extra classes were more than 
twice as likely to read correctly than children who had not had extra 
classes. A related study by Le and Baulch (2011) focusing on children 
aged 8 and 15 did not find significant correlations between tutoring 
and achievement.
In summary, the research literature shows mixed findings on the impact 
of private tutoring on academic achievement. Much depends on the grade levels 
and on the specific national and local circumstances. The large numerical data 
sets allow for statistical modeling, though they do not always permit inferences of 
the implications of different types and durations of provision. Tutoring delivered 
by teachers in large classes to the children for whom they are already responsible, 
and perhaps even in the same classrooms, is clearly different from one-on-one 
tutoring delivered by highly paid professionals in specially equipped learning 
centers. Further variations arise with the large classes taught by “star” tutors, and 
with internet tutoring; and the experiences of lower primary students may be 
very different from those of upper secondary ones.
Whatever the research evidence, however, most families believe that 
tutoring does make a difference—and that even when learning gains are 
disappointing, the solutions may be either to try harder with the existing tutors or 
to seek a different tutor. For many families, the question is not so much whether 
they should purchase tutoring, but how to purchase tutoring that best fits the 
learning needs and temperaments of their children (Box 6). Certainly there is 
enough evidence to indicate that tutoring can make a significant difference in 
learning achievement, even if it does not always do so. 
Broader Skills and Values
Education, of course, is about more than just academic achievement. It includes 
physical development through sports; aesthetic development through music 
and arts; and social development through relationships with peers and other 
members of society at local, national, and even global levels.
The definition of shadow education adopted in this study excludes the 
non-academic domains, though a growing industry provides tutoring in sports, 
music, and even interpersonal relationships. The nature and implications of 
this industry deserve a separate study, especially given the evolving nature of 
university admissions, in which examination scores form just one component of 
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the overall application. Meanwhile, though, it may be observed that the expansion 
of academic supplementary tutoring is commonly at the expense of these other 
domains. One commentator in Hong Kong, China (Liu 2010) has expressed the 
view that:
In the past, the aim of education was to impart knowledge to 
students so that they could develop their talents and their own 
unique personalities. It was hoped they would grow up to be morally 
upstanding, responsible and respectful. Yet the goals seem to have 
changed, and now it is about getting good exam results while 
ignoring whole person development. I think this change is due to 
the growing trend of tutorial classes…. They have successfully turned 
education into a commodity. Society now appears to equate success 
with good results. Students seek the skills to do well in exams rather 
than engage in the genuine pursuit of knowledge.
Box 6 Finding the Right Tutor in Singapore
The difficulties that parents face in judging quality may be exemplified by patterns in 
Singapore. The first problem is lack of information. Parents have to rely on word of 
mouth or advertising when choosing providers for their children. 
But the choice can be an expensive gamble. Secondary 3 student Tan Sing 
Wai, for instance, says he has experienced the “ineffectiveness” of private tuition. 
During his last 2 years at primary school, he received mathematics tutoring in a 
neighborhood mall. The center, which has half a dozen outlets in Singapore, had 
advertised impressive scores for around 20 of its students on posters prominently 
displayed in the mall.
“The ads made my mum think they were really good,” says Sing Wai. Yet for 
2 years, his marks stubbornly refused to budge beyond the B grade he had when 
he first started. His teacher was a fresh graduate passing time tutoring students 
while looking for a full-time job. All the while, the S$200 (US$150) bills his parents 
received each month for the tutoring steadily mounted. “By the time we realized 
the tuition was not helping, the PSLE [Primary School Leaving Examination] was 
around the corner and I just could not leave,” he says.
Understandably, Sing Wai is keen to see tutoring centers publicize improvement 
rates for all their students, in addition to the achievements of the individual 
top scorers. The teenager now attends another center, and in less than a year his 
mathematics grades have shot up from B3 to A1.
Source: Basu (2010).
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Especially at the level of senior secondary education, students commonly drop 
sports, music, and arts altogether, and have little time for focused attention to 
interpersonal matters. Public concern in Sri Lanka, which has echoes elsewhere, 
has also focused on the neglect of spiritual domains. As a result, in 2010 some 
provincial authorities in Sri Lanka prohibited private tutoring of children between 
the ages of 5 and 16 between 8:00 am and 2:00 pm on Sundays and on the monthly 
Buddhist days of religious observance known as Poya Days (Jayamanne 2010). 
More positively, private tutoring can help to develop children’s self-esteem 
and sense of achievement. Slow learners may be enabled to keep up with their 
peers, and fast learners can stretch their learning further. Certain types of 
tutoring may provide a more rounded education; and tutoring may promote 
study habits that stress the importance of learning and self-discipline. Japan’s 
juku have been part of a social fabric that has stressed diligence and learning, and 
in turn has been a major ingredient in the country’s economic success (Dierkes 
2011). Similar remarks might be made about tutorial institutions in the Republic 
of Korea (The Economist 2011), and perhaps Singapore and Taipei,China.
On the other side are concerns in some countries about corruption. One 
report in Viet Nam (Vu et al. 2011:20) noted that teachers who provide extra 
private classes for the school pupils for whom they are already responsible 
commonly disclose examination questions in advance during those classes. The 
report pointed out (p.20) that private extra classes “clearly corrupt the fair and 
true appraisal of students’ performance.” In the PRC, teachers are prohibited 
from providing private tutoring for their existing pupils, but instead commonly 
engage in systems of referrals through which one teacher sends students to a 
colleague in exchange for that teacher sending students in return. The students 
may know that this happens, and thus learn at an early stage in life from their 
teachers—who are perhaps second only to their parents in acting as powerful role 
models—about connections and bending of rules (Zhang 2012).
Other parts of Asia have stronger ethical standards, and such types of 
corruption are rarely witnessed in Hong Kong, China; Japan; Republic of Korea; 
and Singapore. However, even in these societies parents and others worry about 
some of the values promoted by tutoring. For example, in Hong Kong, China, 
one way through which the “star” tutors attract clients is by using vocabulary 
in the classroom that appeals to teenagers but that would not be considered 
appropriate in schools. The star tutors also have very flashy lifestyles. Hong Kong’s 
major English-language newspaper, the South China Morning Post (2010:A10) 
pointed out that the tutors “boast about their millionaire status, and perpetuate 
a youth culture that prides high exam scores over genuine knowledge.” The 
newspaper added:
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Unfortunately, many youngsters look up to them as role models, 
or at least admire their earning power. What should clearly be 
unacceptable has become an accepted or even necessary part of 
schooling in Hong Kong. 
Such sentiments are echoed in Bangkok, Colombo, Taipei City, and other parts of 
the region where the phenomenon of “star tutors” has taken hold.
Efficiencies and Inefficiencies
A fundamental principle for many people, especially economists, is that resources 
should be used with maximum efficiency to achieve designated goals. The 
question then arising is whether the expansion of shadow education promotes or 
diminishes efficiency in the use of resources. 
In general, it must be admitted, mainstream school systems are themselves 
somewhat inefficient machines for achieving their goals. School systems are often 
shaped more by historical circumstances, economic conditions, and social norms 
than by deliberate planning. These norms dictate, for example, that periods of 
activity should be divided into terms and vacations, that individual subjects 
should be separated from each other, and that children should commence 
schooling around the age of six (though increasingly earlier with preschooling) 
and progress through a set of grades on a yearly basis. Over the decades and 
centuries, many policymakers have sought to change various components of 
these models (Rich 1975, Bishop 1989, Delors 1996, Hershock et al. 2007). They 
have had some success, though in general school systems have demonstrated 
strong resilience (Psacharopoulos 1989, Benavot et al. 2006). 
At first sight, it might be assumed that private tutoring would be more 
efficient than public schooling. Operating in a marketplace, tutors run businesses 
that would seem to demand careful use of resources and that serve clients who 
presumably want value for money. If the managers do not attend to these matters, 
then their businesses are likely to close down. Some large tutoring companies even 
have research departments to identify cost-effective approaches to teaching and 
learning through computer software and other means. Smaller companies cannot 
undertake such research, but they must still heed the efficiency of operation; and 
even self-employed tutors working on an individual basis have to budget their 
time and other inputs carefully. 
However, even if internal efficiency in a business sense may be assumed, 
wider efficiency might be less easily demonstrated. The first problem, as 
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indicated above, is that it cannot be assumed that private tutoring always results 
in learning gains. Much depends on the motivation, attitudes, and learning styles 
of the learners as well as on the motivation, attitudes, and teaching styles of the 
tutors. The empirical evidence does not indicate a consistent, positive correlation 
between time spent on tutoring and increased academic achievement. For 
several reasons, the absence of a consistent correlation does not always reduce 
demand for tutoring. First, few clients have investigated the empirical evidence 
and therefore have to operate on the basis of assumptions and advertisements 
rather than clear evidence; second, clients are pressed to achieve higher grades 
and believe that success is possible; and third, tutoring establishments, like 
schools, may be adept at taking credit for academic success while avoiding 
accountability for academic failure. In this respect, many educational institutions 
continue to operate despite unsatisfactory performance from a simple 
input-output perspective.
The second issue, as noted, is that shadow education tends to focus on narrow 
domains of achievement. While some individual tutors and tutoring centers may 
stress study skills and well-rounded development, cram schools in Japan; Republic 
of Korea; Taipei,China; and elsewhere focus mainly on examination skills 
(Roesgaard 2006, Kim and Chang 2010, Liu 2012). Table 11 reports the views of a 
sample of 44 elementary teachers of mathematics in Taipei City. While 82% of the 
teachers felt that cram schools assisted students with mathematics computational 
skills, and 70% felt that cram schools assisted with homework completion, 52% 
felt that cram schools had a negative impact on children’s understanding of 
mathematical concepts. As explained by one teacher (Huang 2004:296):
Some children [who] attended cram schools pre-learned the lessons, 
giving them a false impression about their mathematical competence; 
thus they tended to be less attentive or were frequently distracted. 
Consequently they were unable to perform well in class eventually.
Huang further explained (pp.296–297):
Cram schools place emphasis on “short-cut” and “effectiveness,” and focus 
solely on producing the correct answers to problems rather than exploring 
the systematic structure of mathematical concepts. Children frequently fail 
to solve problems that look novel to them. They just learn to mechanically 
apply a formula when solving problems through drill and practice. Such 
rote practice may enhance their homework performance or term tests 
that cover only content retention, but may weaken their meaningful 
construction of mathematical knowledge.
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Many teachers in Taipei,China and elsewhere also lament the fact that the 
pressures on children from cram schooling take them away from wider forms 
of personal and social development—i.e., that even if gains are achieved in one 
domain, they may contribute to losses in other domains. 
Nevertheless, Table 11 does indicate some positive views in all categories. 
Among these positive dimensions (Huang 2004:297–298) are that:
Teachers benefit from homework supervision provided by cram 
schools. This can save time in checking assignments and help to 
keep them on schedule. Furthermore some low-achieving children 
can catch up with other students through extra programs in cram 
schools. This tends to narrow the gap of individual differences among 
students with mixed achievement levels, thus enabling a smoother 
teaching schedule.
In a rather different setting, complementarities between the mainstream 
and the shadow were also noted by Nazeer (2006) in a qualitative study of the 
learning styles of nine students in the Maldives. All the students received tutoring, 
and Nazeer noted that teachers in schools generally used direct explanation 
methods, while tutors in tutorial centers gave students opportunities to discuss 
concepts. When Nazeer asked students what happened when they did not 
understand something during lessons at school, five of the students indicated that 
they sought help from their tutors rather than their teachers. Their comments 
(p.159) included:
•	 Almost all students in my class go to private tuition. So if we don’t 
understand something in the school we ask our tutor at night.
Table 11 Teachers’ Views of the Influence of Cram Schools on 
Children’s Mathematics Learning, Taipei,China (%)
Learning Outcome
Positive 
Influence
Negative 
Influence
No 
Influence
No 
Comments
Computational Skills 82 7 2  9
Mathematics Homework 
Completion 70  5 – 25
Understanding 
Mathematical Concepts 16 52 9 23
Self-Confidence in 
Mathematics Learning 64  4 7 25
Source: Huang (2004: 295).
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•	 I tell Miss [the classroom teacher] if I don’t understand anything but 
not in the class. I go to the staff room sometimes during the interval 
or after school. If I can’t find Miss then I ask my tuition teacher in 
the evening.
In such instances, it can be argued that the tutoring complements the 
schooling by increasing the overall effectiveness of learning. The teachers 
asserted that they had no time for individual attention during 35-minute periods 
and during the crowded school day, and no doubt would have argued that the 
overall efficiency of the system was increased through the complementary 
nature of roles. However, the existence of private tutoring to some extent 
permitted the teachers to abdicate from domains that were arguably part of their 
responsibility within the normal school day, and required an overall increase 
in time for teaching and learning, which is not the hallmark of an efficiently 
operating education system. 
Moreover, in some settings inefficiencies are expanded further when 
students pay more attention to tutors for whom they or their parents are directly 
paying money than to school teachers, who seem to be free of charge and who 
may be taken for granted. This is part of the hidden curriculum of tutoring, 
which can lead to an undervaluing of school systems. Furthermore, students 
who work long hours at tutoring centers may be short of energy for daytime 
schooling. Kim (2007:7–8) chronicled the daily lives of a number of young people 
in the Republic of Korea. Several of them attended tutoring centers until late each 
the evening. The only way to secure energy for their evening classes was to sleep 
during lessons at school.
From the perspective of inefficiencies, even more problematic may be 
circumstances in which regular teachers also provide private tutoring. Such 
teachers may be tired, and may reserve their energies for the private classes after 
school. Particular problems may arise when the teachers tutor their existing 
students. In some societies, both teachers and parents might argue in favor of 
such arrangements on the ground that teachers already know the pupils and the 
curricular domains that the pupils have and have not covered. As expressed by 
one teacher in Brunei Darussalam, for example (Waleed 2009):
We, as teachers, cannot simply put a limit to how much we can teach…. 
This is especially so when we, as teachers, are approached by the parents 
themselves, asking us to contribute our spare time and energy to help 
improve their children, our own students. 
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In other settings, however, teachers may not be fully professional and 
dedicated. In Nepal, Jayachandran (2008:2) observed that:
…teachers sometimes refrain from teaching some of the curriculum 
during school in order to generate demand for their fee-generating 
tutoring classes. Teachers say, in not so many words or sometimes 
even explicitly, “You need to know X, Y, and Z to pass the exam. We’ll 
cover X and Y in class. If you want to learn Z, come to tutoring.
With reference to Cambodia, Dawson (2009) described such practices as among 
the “the tricks of the teacher.” In such cases, the shadow education system 
leads to inefficiencies in the school system. This is not only a matter of teachers 
operating in less than optimal ways; it is also a matter of the children’s time being 
used inefficiently. In such circumstances, children may be deprived of other 
constructive opportunities to use their time, including for leisure and rest.
While in some countries students who are receiving much tutoring are 
tired and therefore sleep in school classrooms, in other countries they may stop 
going to school altogether. With reference to Azerbaijan, Silova and Kazimzade 
(2006:128) reported that:
…numerous interviews with school directors, teachers, and students 
reveal that school nonattendance increases shortly before the end 
of the school year (especially in the last grade of secondary school), 
when students begin skipping classes to attend private tutoring lessons 
during school hours. Some students pay bribes to their teachers or 
school administrators to be excused from school and instead attend 
private tutoring lessons. Many interviewed teachers and education 
officials reported instances of empty classes in secondary schools, 
when students would leave schools en mass to attend private tutoring 
lessons instead. 
Similar observations have been made about senior secondary education 
in Armenia (UNDP 2007:45), Georgia (Matiashvili and Kutateladze 2006:206), 
and Sri Lanka (Gunasekara 2009:85; Suraweera 2011:22). Box 7 indicates with 
reference to India that the phenomenon may also appear at the primary level—in 
this case with negative consequences for the children’s learning.
Finally, the shadow education system may undermine the mainstream 
school system by removing talent. For example, in Hong Kong, China, some 
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of the excellent tutors are former school teachers who have chosen to leave the 
schools in search of greater incomes and possibly greater autonomy. Other tutors 
have never been school teachers but perhaps would have been had the avenue of 
tutoring not been available. Thus, from the perspective of the education sector as 
a whole, it is far from certain that the operation of a shadow system is an efficient 
use of the overall resources of society. 
Inequalities and Social Cohesion
A recurrent theme of this study is that shadow education maintains and 
exacerbates social inequalities. It is self-evident that more prosperous families are 
able to purchase greater quantities and better qualities of supplementary tutoring 
than can less prosperous families. Diversification within the industry has made 
forms of tutoring available at lower cost, e.g., through large classes provided by 
companies and delivered by star tutors. However, some families cannot afford 
even the less expensive forms of tutoring or cannot access them because they live 
in remote locations. 
These patterns may be viewed in the context of official policies on fee-
free education that are espoused in several international conventions and in the 
Box 7 More Tutoring, Less Learning
Bhattacharjea et al. (2011) tracked the learning of 30,000 children in rural 
government primary schools in five Indian states. They collected data not only on 
school achievement but also on related variables including tutoring, and they visited 
the schools three times over the year of the research.
The researchers noted (p.71) that 15.9% of grade 2 children and 18.1% of grade 
4 children had received private tutoring. However, there was a strong negative 
relationship between tutoring and attendance at school. Children in both grades 
were far less likely to have been found present in school on all three visits. A possible 
explanation was that parents expected their children to learn more in paid classes 
than in school, and therefore insisted less on regular school attendance. 
However, such parental assumptions appeared to have been misplaced. Grade 2 
students who had received tutoring did perform slightly better on the baseline test, 
but exactly the same on the endline test as their classmates who had not received 
tutoring. And in grade 4, students receiving private tutoring performed worse on 
average than their counterparts who did not, on both baseline and endline tests, 
presumably because they attended school less often.
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constitutions of such countries as Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Japan, and 
Pakistan. Almost all Asian governments were signatories to the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which indicated (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 1989: Article 28) that the signatory states would
•	 make primary education compulsory and available free to all; and
•	 encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, 
... make them available and accessible to every child, and take 
appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and 
offering financial assistance in case of need.
Likewise the declaration of the World Education Forum (WEF 2000:43), 
endorsed by 164 governments including the majority of those in Asia, contains 
the objective of “ensuring that by 2015 all children ... have access to and complete, 
free and compulsory primary education of good quality.” 
It might be argued that shadow education is not covered by such statements 
because it exists in the private sector rather than the public sector. However, families 
in contexts as diverse as Armenia, India, Japan, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam (UNDP 
2007:50; Dang 2008:82; Sen 2009:13; OECD 2011a:111; Pallegedara 2011:16) have 
increasingly felt that supplementary tutoring has become essential. A study by 
Chugh (2011) of school dropouts in the slums of Delhi, India, found that 25.9% of 
respondents expressed inability to bear the costs of private tutoring (p.23):
In the opinion of parents as well as students, attending school 
without simultaneously availing [of] private tuition does not yield 
any positive results…. [When] students felt their family could not 
afford private tuition, they simply withdrew from school. 
This remark applied to students at the secondary level, but in other locations 
would also apply to students at the primary level. In effect, private tutoring 
has become a factor excluding students from access even to officially fee-free 
public education.
In turn, these observations may be linked to matters of social cohesion. 
The remarks above about the correlations between tutoring and academic 
achievement raise doubts about the effectiveness of some forms of tutoring; 
but the research evidence is mixed, and in any case even the evidence that is 
relatively clear is not widely understood. From the perspective of social cohesion, 
therefore, perceptions of inequalities in access are more important than realities 
of inequalities measured by the extent to which the services purchased actually 
do lead to improved learning outcomes.
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In some societies, perceptions of social inequalities have led to major 
unrest, which has had economic as well as political consequences. The decades of 
civil war in Sri Lanka may come immediately to mind, as might various incidents 
in the PRC, India, Tajikistan, and many other locations. 
Beginning with Sri Lanka, Pallegedara’s (2011) review of household 
expenditure data showed that Sinhalese students, who comprise 70% of the 
total population, were much more likely to invest in private tutoring than Tamil 
students, who comprise 20%. Beginning with the 1995/96 data, Pallegedara 
reported that only 16.7% of Tamil households spent money on private tutoring 
compared with 24.3% of Sinhalese households. By 2006/07 the proportions in 
both groups had greatly increased and the gaps had reduced, but differences 
remained (Table 12). Comparable figures were reported by Gunasekara (2009:86). 
Referring to his sample of grade 13 students, Gunasekara indicated that 100% of 
students in Sinhala-medium schools received private tutoring, while only 67% of 
students in Tamil-medium schools did so.
Table 12 Proportions of Households with Positive Expenditures  
on Tutoring, Sri Lanka (%)
School Year
Ethnicity Location 
Sinhala Tamil Other Rural Urban Estate
1995/96 24.3 16.7 25.0 19.2 40.5 14.8
2006/07 64.8 59.4 63.5 64.4 62.9 58.2
Source: Pallegedara (2011:24).
A related picture has been presented for Viet Nam by Dang (2008). Viet Nam 
has many minorities in contrast to the more bifurcated pattern in Sri Lanka, and 
no doubt patterns vary considerably among the minorities. Nevertheless, Table 
13 shows wide disparities between the majority Kinh and the minorities as a 
group. The gap is greatest at the primary level and is much reduced at the upper 
secondary level. However, the reduction in disparities in upper secondary may 
simply indicate that many minority students have dropped out before that stage 
rather than reflecting greater equality in the education system.
In contrast to Sri Lanka and Viet Nam, where the ethnic majorities 
receive more tutoring than the minorities, in Malaysia higher rates of tutoring 
are received by minorities. This has already been indicated by the expenditure 
data in Table 5. Complementing those statistics, Jelani and Tan (2012) found 
that students of Chinese ethnicity in Penang formed 38% of the population but 
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46% of students in their sample, and that Malays formed 51% of the population 
but only 44% of their sample. Similarly, Tan (2011:105) found that in his sample 
of schools in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, 65.8% of Chinese students in grades 
1–3 had received tutoring compared with 45.6% of Indian students and 28.4% of 
Malay students. 
In addition to the data on ethnicity, Tables 12 and 13 present data on 
the locations of students receiving tutoring. The categories for Sri Lanka are 
rural, urban, and estate. The estate sector, referring mainly to regions in which 
tea, rubber, and coconut are grown, embraced about 5% of the population and 
was characterized mainly by particularly low incomes. For Viet Nam, the table 
simply presents the categories of rural and urban. Although in both countries 
major differences exist within rural and urban locations, the main point, which 
is echoed in most other countries, is that rural families are likely to receive less 
tutoring, both because their incomes are lower and because they do not have 
access to the types of tutoring offered in urban areas. 
Considering the challenges for social cohesion that arise from private 
tutoring, Heyneman (2011) added the dimensions of corruption that are 
associated with the sector in many countries. This can be at the local level, when 
teachers themselves offer private lessons and exert undue pressure on students 
to take those lessons (Bray 2003, Dong et al. 2006, Dawson 2009), or it may 
be at a system level, when large companies claim to have inside knowledge of 
examination systems, make questionable statements in advertisements, and/or 
exert pressure on governments to waive regulations (Dhall 2011a). Such practices 
raise resentment among groups that feel disadvantaged by the practices.
Table 13 Proportions of Students Receiving Private Tutoring,  
Viet Nam, 1997/98 (%)
Level
Ethnicity Location 
Majority Minority Rural Urban
All 
Viet Nam
Primary 37.0  7.1 27.4 54.7 31.1
Lower Secondary 60.7 19.0 50.6 76.1 55.9
Upper Secondary 78.0 55.9 73.7 82.3 76.7
Source: Dang (2008:91).
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Implications for Policy Makers
This study has indicated that shadow education is already very prominent in 
some parts of Asia, and is growing fast in others. Even in the regions where 
shadow education has a significant history, it is changing in size and shape. In 
the past, many policy makers chose to ignore the phenomenon. In contemporary 
times, few policy makers can afford to do so. In many countries the shadow 
education system is already too large to be ignored; and in others it is small but 
growing. Perhaps, indeed, the latter situations are ones for which policy attention 
is particularly urgent, because the authorities have opportunities to steer the 
shadow education system before it assumes too many undesirable features and 
encourages vested interests, which later become obstacles to reform.
For all policy makers, a starting point should be the data. Very few countries 
have good data on this topic, and much better information of both a quantitative 
and qualitative nature is desirable. This can assist policy makers elsewhere in the 
region as well as their counterparts in the countries in which the information is 
collected.
A second domain demanding particular attention concerns systems of 
assessment and selection. Insofar as examinations at different levels are major 
drivers of the scale and shape of shadow education, reform of those systems of 
assessment and selection is likely to impact the form and role of private tutoring.
Allied to assessment and selection are other components of curricula. 
Some policy makers have achieved fundamental curriculum reforms that have 
had significant consequences for private tutoring. However, reforms sometimes 
have unexpected consequences. Again, policy makers can learn from experiences 
in which well-intended reforms have led to expansion rather than contraction of 
shadow education. 
A further domain deserving particular focus is technology. Recent 
technological advances, such as adaptive on-line software, may reach learners 
with a wider range of needs and in diverse locations. As always, the claims of 
enthusiasts need to be evaluated carefully, but indeed the technological advances 
are likely to bring some radical shifts in both mainstream schools and the shadow 
education sector.
Moving beyond technical matters, the question turns to management and 
particularly to regulations. A summary of existing regulations on such matters as 
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the licensing of tutors and tutorial centers, and the permissibility of mainstream 
teachers collecting fees for private tutoring of their existing students, shows 
diversity. Perhaps even greater diversity arises in the extent to which regulations 
are implemented and are successful in achieving their objectives. 
Finally, it is important to consider partnerships. Governments cannot 
effectively tackle these issues alone. The major categories of partnership include 
mainstream schools, civil society, teachers’ unions, and the tutoring industry 
itself. In some countries, associations of tutoring providers have emerged that 
engage in self-regulation and are keen to work with governments for broader 
social welfare.
Securing Data and Monitoring Trends
Much of what has been presented in this study has been gathered by individuals 
and small teams of researchers working on limited budgets. Many of these 
researchers gathered basic information on the scale, scope, and intensity of 
tutoring. Some of the studies have small samples, so are illustrative but not 
statistically robust. Stronger data on basic indicators may be more effectively and 
economically coordinated at the national level. 
The market for shadow education cuts across sectors. As an emerging 
industry and important source of employment, it falls under the responsibility 
of ministries of commerce and related bodies. In many countries, government 
agencies in charge of monitoring both education and the economy routinely 
conduct a number of surveys, each with many items vying for space in the list 
of questions. These surveys can be modified to include data on private tutoring 
without adding significantly to their length. The following paragraphs outline 
strategies for gathering basic indicators on the production, consumption, and 
effectiveness of private tutoring. 
Indicators on the production of private tutoring can be gathered by 
amending questions on population census forms. For instance, most censuses 
ask respondents to indicate their main occupation. These forms could include 
a category for “private tutor.” This would not add to the length of the survey, 
but would provide a way to assess growth in the supply of private tutoring over 
time. Since censuses are nationwide and representative, policy makers could get 
a better idea of what kinds of people are providing private tutoring. This might 
include their educational levels, household incomes, and rural or urban place 
of residence. 
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Indicators on the consumption of tutoring can be compiled by including 
a category for private tutoring in national surveys of household expenditures. 
Some governments already do this by listing private tutoring as a subcategory 
under educational expenses. Household surveys that do not track private tutoring 
are missing an important opportunity. Household expenditure surveys can be 
used to examine the links between tutoring and household incomes, ethnicities, 
linguistic groups, and other sources of social stratification. The data can also 
be used to monitor the relationships between public and private expenditures 
on education.
Indicators on the effectiveness of private tutoring can be gathered by 
adding an item about private tutoring to tests of educational achievement. For 
instance, students sitting for college entrance examinations can be asked whether 
they have received tutoring in the previous year for any of the subjects for which 
they are being tested. The precise phrasing of such questions is very important. 
For example, they must distinguish between fee-free tutoring, offered perhaps by 
family members, and fee-based tutoring. They should also differentiate between 
types of tutoring, such as face-to-face or via the internet, individual or group, 
and so forth. 
The importance of this information may justify the additional demand 
placed on students to provide such details. In most Asian countries, examinations 
are the primary mechanism for determining academic achievement and admission 
into higher levels of education. If certain groups are being systematically 
disadvantaged in the admissions process because they cannot afford private 
tutoring, the legitimacy of these examinations as indicators of ability may be 
called into question.
These solutions can be implemented by every country covered in this 
report. They cost relatively little to do while providing a wealth of useful data. 
Some authorities may wish to go further. Governments that intend to implement 
policies that may have an effect on private tutoring—such as providing vouchers 
for low-income students, increasing teacher pay, or reforming examinations—
may want to conduct studies designed to provide more relevant and timely 
information. In all cases, it is better to have such information before choosing a 
policy direction. For instance, some governments have hoped that salary increases 
for teachers might curb the practice of teachers giving fee-based tutoring to their 
own students. Surveys and interviews of teachers given before implementing such 
policies may help determine whether salary increases would be effective, and if 
so, whether there is a certain threshold that would need to be met.
In addition, governments can benefit from the work of academics 
and students. Many such studies are driven by the incentive structures in 
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universities and by individual career paths, but governments can provide their 
own incentives through research grants and commissioned studies. Research 
on shadow education encounters methodological challenges arising from the 
facts that much of it is informal or semiformal and that tutors may not wish 
to expose their incomes and pedagogical practices to external scrutiny (Bray 
2010). Nevertheless, as the volume of research on shadow education expands, 
many of the methodological challenges are being resolved. Policy makers thus 
have increasing access to robust studies with both quantitative and qualitative 
orientations. And even if the specific research base in individual districts, 
provinces, and countries is not yet robust, much can be learned from studies in 
other locations that produce informative findings. 
Reforming Assessment and Selection Systems
Insofar as much supplementary tutoring is driven by systems of assessment 
and selection, changes in the nature of those systems will lead to changes in 
the tutoring. All education systems have major watershed assessments at the 
end of secondary schooling, and some also have them at earlier stages. Some 
governments have decided that assessments at the end of primary schooling 
do not need to be of the high-stakes type, particularly if their countries have 
universal junior secondary education. These governments hope that when they 
reduce the high-stakes nature of assessment, they can also reduce the pressures 
for private tutoring.
In this connection, experiences in the Republic of Korea are particularly 
noteworthy. Among the most dramatic educational reforms in Korean history 
was the replacement of grade 6 examinations by a random lottery as part of a 
middle-school equalization policy introduced in Seoul in 1969, in other major 
cities in 1970, and in the rest of the country in 1971 (Kim and Lee 2001:8). The 
reform aimed to permit the normal development of children by reducing stress, 
to prevent elementary schools from focusing excessively on preparation for the 
middle school examination, to discourage private tutoring, to narrow the gaps 
between different middle schools, and to reduce the financial and psychological 
burden on households. 
The reform had some success, at least in the short term. However, schools 
found that they had greater variations in learning levels among their intakes; and 
abolition of the middle school examination and expansion of enrollments meant 
that the watershed was simply transferred to the next level. Ambitious families 
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who were dissatisfied with the mixed-ability classes of middle schools invested in 
private tutoring to prepare for the high school entrance examination. 
The next step, therefore, was the High School Equalization Policy, launched 
in Seoul and Pusan in 1974 and gradually expanded to several major cities. By 
2003, 72% of students in the country were subject to the policy (Kim 2004:10). 
Like the middle-school policy, this initiative abolished entrance examinations 
and introduced random school assignment. Again it had some effect, at least in 
the short run (Lee et al. 2010:100), but again the policy moved the competition 
up to a higher level; and the college entrance examinations still had a backwash 
on the middle schools and primary schools. 
The year 1980 brought a military government, which was determined to 
tackle the issue. In that year, an estimated 12.9% of elementary school pupils, 
15.3% of middle school pupils, and 26.2% of high school pupils were receiving 
private tutoring (Kim 2007:1). The government transferred control of the college 
entrance examinations from individual institutions to a new state-controlled 
body operating the College Entrance Achievement Test (CEAT). In the most 
radical measure to date, the authorities prohibited both extra high school classes 
and private tutoring in academic subjects. Again, however, the prohibition proved 
very difficult to enforce and as a result was gradually relaxed. Parents continued 
to seek tutoring, and the prohibition was challenged in the courts. In 2000, the 
prohibition was declared unconstitutional and abandoned. 
Another measure during the 1980s was the introduction of special 
purpose high schools (SPHSs). These institutions were a response to criticisms 
of mediocrity in the mainstream high schools to which students were allocated 
by lottery. The SPHSs served gifted students and focused on science, foreign 
languages, athletics, or other domains. By 2007, the SPHSs served 4.2% of all 
secondary pupils (Kim 2007:3); and of course the fierce competition for entry 
had a backwash on private tutoring. 
A further reform of the college entry system was introduced in 1994. The 
CEAT had been an achievement text based on specific subject matter rather than 
an academic aptitude test based on more general knowledge. The new College 
Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) was designed to measure whether applicants had 
the general academic aptitudes required for higher education, and aimed to 
encourage high-level thinking rather than fragmented short-term memorization. 
Kim (2004:13) states that the CSAT did improve some of the teaching and learning 
methods in high schools, and that teachers and students realized that cramming 
fragmented information into instruction was no longer a viable method of study. 
However, Kim added (p.13):
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the CSAT encourages a different kind of memorization because it is 
made up of multiple-choice questions that offer five answer options. 
Consequently, students are intent on learning test-taking skills that will 
ensure their ability to solve these multiple-choice questions in a limited 
amount of time. One of the best tactics to do so is to memorize the CSAT 
question types and solution methods. To learn these tactics and test-taking 
skills, many students take courses at private tutoring institutions and/or 
hire their own personal private tutors. 
During the 2000s, tutoring expanded to heights that considerably exceeded 
those in the 1970s, when the initial measures to dampen demand were introduced. 
The Korean experience thus illustrates bold efforts that ultimately seem not to 
have had much effect.
Yet policy makers should not conclude from this analysis that all is 
hopeless and that they might as well give up. Moving to a different region, it is 
useful to note Silova’s (2009b) analysis of patterns in 12 countries of Eastern/
Central Europe and Central/Northern Asia. Silova observed (p.89) that “the 
scale of private tutoring is the lowest in countries that do not have high-stakes 
examinations, where public satisfaction with mainstream education is reportedly 
high, and where teachers are paid comparatively well.” These characteristics were 
present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovakia, which were the three 
countries with the lowest amounts of private tutoring according to the surveys 
on which Silova reported. At the other end of the scale, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Lithuania were countries with high-stakes 
secondary school examinations and large amounts of private tutoring. Tutoring 
was also extensive in Mongolia and Ukraine, which did not have high-stakes 
examinations; but in those countries public satisfaction and teachers’ salaries 
were low and thus provided alternative explanations. 
Similar remarks have been made in Malaysia by Jelani and Tan (2012), 
who found that 49.4% of the households responding to their survey reported 
“preparation for national examination” to be the strongest reason for seeking 
private tutoring. The researchers remarked (p.13) that
A greater focus on knowledge acquisition via fun and creative 
learning would relieve students from being too exam-oriented. 
Recent announcements by the Malaysian educational authorities to 
revamp two national examinations, the Lower Secondary Assessment 
to a school-based assessment examination beginning in 2016 and 
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streamlining the syllabus of the Primary School Evaluation Test, 
augurs well in reducing the anxiety of Malaysian school children.
Nevertheless, such matters are not always straightforward. On a technical 
level, even sophisticated systems encounter difficulties in benchmarking school-
based assessments so that they can be seen to be comparable across schools. And 
systems that are already threatened by corruption are likely to be even more 
exposed if significant decision-making power is placed in the hands of teachers 
without adequate systems for monitoring and for enforcement of accountability. 
When the Cambodian government eliminated the grade 6 examination, teachers 
introduced their own examinations and, in Dawson’s words (2010:17), “carried 
on business as usual” without the quality-control measures that the common 
examination had provided. 
Changing the Curriculum
Assessment and selection mechanisms are of course related to curricula. In 
addition, some other dimensions of curricula may be considered. Several accounts 
of unintended consequences from curriculum reform may sound warnings to 
policy makers; but positive experiences may also be noted.
The first example of unintended consequences is from West Bengal, which 
is among the Indian states with the highest rates of private tutoring (India 2010:A-
276; Pratham 2012:235). Two government policies that have unintentionally 
stimulated these high rates are related to languages and homework.
In 1983, the government of West Bengal abolished the teaching of English 
at the primary level in public schools, narrowing the curriculum to the other 
subjects then taught. The move sought to make primary education more accessible 
to rural and poor children, who had low enrollment and high drop-out rates. 
Roy’s (2010) evaluation found a positive and significant effect on educational 
attainment, particularly among children from poor families. However, Roy also 
found large increases in expenditure on private tutoring. Families who could 
afford it wished their children still to have English language skills, and sought 
them through the private sector, since they were no longer taught in schools. In 
1999, the government reintroduced English in grade 3, and in 2004 reintroduced 
it in grade 1. However, by that time the supply of tutoring had greatly expanded, 
and most households had become used to consuming it.
The second policy assigned home tasks to primary students in order to 
extend the scope and impact of schooling (Sen 2010:318). Yet many parents were 
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unable to help their children with these home tasks. Even in schools with good 
teaching and with children who could complete their studies without help, many 
parents insisted on tutoring on the grounds that “the child would do even better.” 
And illiterate parents felt that tutoring was unavoidable, since they could not 
themselves help their children with the tasks. Many teachers also considered 
tutoring essential, especially for the “first-generation learners.” A report of the 
Pratichi Education Trust added (Rana 2009:23) that the term “first-generation 
learner” had done more harm than good:
It might have been coined with good intentions but its fallout has been quite 
different. “Home task” and the inability of the non-literate parents to help 
their children became so intertwined that it gave teachers an argument that 
such children could not acquire quality education at school. They needed 
extra support. In other words, first generation learners needed tuition.
Instructively, the demands of homework may also be felt in high-income 
and well-educated societies. Tan (2009:97) reported that many parents in 
Singapore feel disempowered by the numerous curriculum revisions that “have 
made the school tests and examinations incomprehensible.” Private tutors offer 
to come to the rescue. 
Another example of unintended consequences from curriculum reform 
has been in Georgia. The National Curriculum changed many times between 
2005 and 2011. One change was the introduction of integrated classes in science 
subjects: in the basic and secondary school, students would take chemistry during 
the first term, biology in the second term, and physics in the third term. Soon after 
introducing the new initiative several problems arose related to the learning and 
teaching of science subjects, and in 2009 the Ministry of Education and Science 
abolished the scheme. In 2011, when the Ministry introduced school leaving 
examinations in eight school subjects including chemistry, biology, and physics, 
students affected by the curriculum reform felt very challenged. The majority 
sought private tutoring classes in science subjects in order to pass a threshold 
and get a school diploma. A 2011 study found that 40% of respondents named 
inconsistency between school curricula and the demands of the examinations as 
one of the main reasons for receiving private tutoring (EPPM 2011:28).
A further policy initiative with unintended consequences was initiated 
in Hong Kong, China. Curriculum developers were highly critical of what they 
perceived to be excessive dependence on rote memorization and formulaic 
thinking in schooling, some of which was promoted by the tutoring industry. 
In 2009, liberal studies became a mandatory subject for all senior secondary 
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school students, with the first public examination in the subject to be held in 
2012. Liberal studies was designed to help students develop critical thinking 
about complex issues through the exploration of broad, interdisciplinary areas, 
such as “self and personal development” and “science, technology, and the 
environment.” Yet, rather than being greeted as a welcome humanization of the 
curriculum, liberal studies was met with great anxiety. The education system 
had long trained students to produce clear and definitive answers to narrow 
questions. Unsurprisingly, the tutoring industry, which thrives on parent and 
student anxiety, responded by offering courses in liberal studies that proved very 
popular (Chan 2011, Yeung 2011). Many of the tutors promised clear procedures 
and formulae for constructing answers to the public examinations, even detailing 
how many credits students could expect to earn for each argumentative point 
they made. 
A final example of unintended consequences from curriculum reform 
may be taken from Cambodia, where the Ministry of Education, Youth and 
Sport has encouraged teachers to rely less on lectures and to use more “child-
friendly” pedagogies (Cambodia and UNICEF 2005, Cambodia 2010). With a 
double-shift school day that lasts only 4 hours, teachers have complained that the 
time-consuming child-friendly techniques make it impossible for them to cover 
the full curriculum (Dawson 2010:20). This has created additional justification 
for teachers to offer extra private lessons for whatever is not covered during the 
school day. 
More positively, it is useful to note the After School Program (ASP) in the 
Republic of Korea. This initiative was launched in 2004 to alleviate household 
expenditures on private tutoring and to reduce social inequalities (Bae et 
al. 2010, Lee 2011). By 2010, every school offered the program, and student 
participation rates were 43.1% at the elementary level, 50.0% in middle schools, 
and 79.0% in high schools (KNSO 2011:9). The program was financed mostly 
by the government, though there were small fees in order to promote “buy-in” 
in a literal sense. In addition to the overall subsidies, the government provided 
390,000 vouchers for needy students in 2010, worth 140 billion won (US$14.8 
million) and constituting an increase of 40,000 beneficiaries compared with 2009 
(Jang 2011:37). ASP curricula were determined at the school level, and instructors 
were recruited either from within the education system or from outside. In the 
elementary schools, about two-thirds of the courses in 2010 were extracurricular, 
while one-third were in academic subjects. This balance shifted in the middle 
schools, with respective proportions being 17.4% and 82.6%; and in high schools 
the proportion shifted further still to 7.9% and 92.1% (Jang 2011:38).
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Evaluations of the ASP have indicated positive outcomes. Bae et al. (2009) 
observed that it particularly served girls, rural students, and low-income families. 
It was a significant factor in the reduced overall expenditures on shadow education 
in 2010 compared with 2009 (Figure 1; KNSO 2011). Jang (2011) analyzed the 
participation rates of a cohort of grade 9 students who had joined the program in 
2004 and completed the CSAT in 2007, controlling for family background, school 
location and a number of other variables. Like Bae et al. (2009), she concluded 
that the ASP had succeeded in particularly serving students in rural areas and 
from lower-income groups, and in this respect had reduced disparities. In 
addition, she found that students who participated in the ASP gained an increase 
of 0.23 of a grade in the CSAT compared with students who did not participate 
in the ASP; and ASP participation reduced average household shadow education 
expenditures by 20.9% compared with what it would otherwise have been.
Harnessing Technology
The government of the Republic of Korea has harnessed technology in two major 
initiatives to address the issues of tutoring (Song and Kim 2009): the Educational 
Broadcasting System (EBS) and the Cyber Home Learning System (CHLS). 
The EBS was established in 1990, and gained a reputation for its high-quality 
radio and television programs. In 2004, the government started broadcasting 
lessons for high school students preparing for the CSAT examination. One major 
objective was to provide an alternative to private tutoring. The lessons were 
presented by teachers and other professionals, including some famous tutors. In 
this respect, the government brought the famous tutors from the private space 
to the public space. Among the indicators of uptake are sales of supporting EBS 
textbooks. In 2010, 20.8% of students purchased books, with females purchasing 
in slightly great proportions than males (22.9% compared with 18.9%). Purchases 
of books were fairly modest at the elementary level, viz., 7.2% of students; but 
in general high schools 54.8% of students purchased books (KNSO 2011:10). 
Evaluations of the EBS have shown that it has been particularly effective in 
serving rural areas.
A parallel initiative, also launched in 2004, was the CHLS, which also 
aimed to reduce the need for fee-paying tutoring. Within 5 years it provided a 
personalized learning environment for 1.6 million students, who were supported 
by 6,147 cyber-teachers and 2,692 parent-tutors. An evaluation reported by Kim 
(2009), based on a survey of 55,272 students, 3,842 teachers, and 12,783 parents, 
presented positive findings. One third of the students indicated that their interest 
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in the subject content had grown considerably, and 25.3% indicated that they 
had developed self-directed learning habits. Many of these were academically 
weak students who had relatively little home financial support for their studies. 
At the same time, the evaluators concluded that many students had been saved 
the expense of investing in private tutoring and therefore that overall tutoring 
expenditures had been reduced by the initiative.
In other parts of Asia, on-line platforms with comparable objectives have 
been developed by the private sector. Among the largest is Mathguru in India 
(www.mathguru.com). It provides age-appropriate instructional videos for each 
module, and includes on-line exercises that increase in difficulty as students 
progress. These platforms can record student activity, which is a key both to 
improving the quality of the service and to monitoring student progress.
Also significant is the nonprofit Khan Academy (www.khanacademy.org), 
based in the US and managed by a team of committed individuals with generous 
philanthropic support. With a library of more than 2,700 videos in 2011, the 
Khan Academy provides basic introductions to a diverse range of fields, such as 
Singapore Math, biology, art history, finance, and teacher education. Students 
are encouraged through a number of game-like mechanics, which take the place 
of traditional grades. By December 2011, the Khan Academy had delivered over 
82 million lessons. The company offers sophisticated tracking software, allowing 
parents, teachers, or administrators to track which concepts students have 
mastered. The developers also use these data to refine the algorithms used to 
determine which problems individual students should attempt next. The website 
also has a variety of ways in which students can interact with social networking 
tools and seek coaching from people. One can also foresee arrangements in 
which students help each other through various on-line forums.
While on-line tutoring may not serve as a replacement for face-to-face, 
individualized instruction for every child, it may indeed displace other forms 
of fee-based tutoring, especially those that have minimal interaction between 
tutor and student. Though on-line tutoring may not provide a perfect learning 
experience, it may make an imperfect learning experience more accessible. 
Nevertheless, on-line tutoring is still in its infancy. Much progress remains to 
be made in finding the best ways to target individual students at their current 
levels of proficiency and to offer the support needed to reach the next stage. Such 
progress, moreover, may be better driven by private entrepreneurs than by civil 
servants, especially since few countries can match the combination of financial 
and professional resources found in the Republic of Korea. Governments 
that wish to encourage development of on-line tutoring platforms might be 
better advised to offer incentive funds to seed a number of competing teams 
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rather than to try to undertake the work themselves. Governments could state 
the criteria that the platforms would have to meet, such as being linked with 
classrooms and teachers, and covering certain curricular subjects. As such, 
governments could still have some control over the developments through a 
form of public-private partnership.
Devising and Implementing Regulations 
Historically, school systems throughout the world have evolved from very little 
government regulation to extensive regulation. Society generally considers 
this important
•	 to protect the students and their families from various forms of 
abuse, and
•	 to steer the managers of institutions in desirable directions for the 
public good. 
Even private schools are commonly governed by regulations on minimum 
qualifications for teachers, physical facilities, and core elements of curriculum; 
and in some jurisdictions the operators of private schools must heed regulations 
on class size, admissions procedures, and financial management. 
Two decades ago, few jurisdictions in Asia or anywhere else had significant 
regulations on private tutoring. Some government regulations did mention private 
tutoring, but in most such documents the relevant sections were restricted to 
one or two clauses that were added on to detailed requirements about schooling. 
These clauses were not the result of careful analysis and consultation, and were 
rarely given much attention either by government officers or by private tutors.
The contemporary era has brought some shift in these patterns, chiefly 
because the shadow education sector has greatly expanded and has come more 
strongly to the awareness of governments and society in general. However, 
the regulatory framework for the shadow education sector remains very loose 
in most countries. It has yet to “catch up” with the regulatory framework for 
regular schooling. 
Content of Regulations
A comparative survey shows a range of balances between regulations derived 
from educational and commercial considerations. Dhall (2011a:1) has depicted 
the situation as in Figure 3. In the jurisdictions that he investigated, the regulations 
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on tutoring were more strongly influenced by the commercial and trade sector 
than by education. Thus, they were dominated by such matters as transparency 
in financial transactions, contractual relationships, and management of premises 
to ensure that fire escapes existed and were accessible. They paid less attention 
to pedagogy, class size, content of curriculum, and teachers’ qualifications. 
However, Dhall added that, although commercial law dominated, educational 
law and expectations shaped commercial behaviors. 
The Appendix to this publication elaborates, with a summary of regulations 
in a range of countries. Most authorities require tutorial centers to register their 
existence, but they are less emphatic about registration of tutors who operate as 
individuals. Some governments have regulations against teachers providing paid 
tutoring for their existing pupils in regular schools, but many governments are 
silent on the matter. In Sri Lanka, some provincial authorities have prohibited 
tutoring at particular times on certain days of the week, and in the Republic of 
Korea tutoring centers have been forbidden to operate after 10:00 pm (Kim and 
Chang 2010:4; Box 8). The authorities in Hong Kong, China set a maximum class 
size, and their counterparts in Viet Nam prohibit tutoring for children who are in 
full-day (as opposed to half-day) schools. 
Another domain of regulation in some jurisdictions concerns advertising. 
Some jurisdictions have consumer complaints councils, which receive grievances 
from members of the public, and again these are operated within commercial 
rather than educational law. Dhall’s (2011a:12) remarks about Australia may have 
wider relevance. He noted several domains in which tutoring advertisements 
have caused concern, including the following:
Figure 3 Overlap of Commercial and Educational Law  
in Regulation of Private Tutoring
Educational 
Regulations, 
Standards, and 
Expectations
Commercial 
Regulations and 
Rules of Commerce 
and Trade
Source: Dhall (2011a:1).
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•	 Use of statistics. Claims such as “95% of our students” get into particular 
schools or universities, or “98% improvement guaranteed in 6 weeks” 
are extremely difficult to verify or even to understand.
•	 Use and publication of student results in external examinations. The 
tutor or company publishes students’ names, photographs, and marks, 
claiming implied ownership. Sometimes this is done without the 
knowledge or consent of the students and their families; and in any 
case, the claims cannot be verified by the general public.
•	 Tutors’ claims of experience with government, examination boards, or 
other authorities. This may include ambiguous names like “Institute,” 
“Higher Education,” and other official-sounding titles with a coat of 
arms intended to look like a government-approved authority.
•	 Tutors’ qualifications and skills. Claims such as “fully qualified” sound 
reassuring but do not explain anything about skills or actual credentials.
Box 8 Limiting the Duration of Shadow Education  
in the Republic of Korea 
On a wet Wednesday evening in Seoul, six government employees gather 
at the office to prepare for a late-night patrol. The mission is as simple as 
it is counter-intuitive: to find children who are studying after 10 p.m. And 
stop them.
Thus began an article by Ripley (2011:41) on the measures adopted by the Korean 
government in 2009 to limit the hours spent by children in supplementary tutorial 
centers (hagwons). Ripley explained (p.42) that the crackdown was “part of a larger 
quest to tame the country’s culture of educational masochism.” She added that the 
problem was not so much that Korean children were not learning enough or working 
hard enough, but rather that they were not working smart:
When I visited some schools, I saw classrooms in which a third of the 
students slept while the teacher continued lecturing, seemingly unfazed. 
Gift stores sell special pillows that fit over your forearm to make desktop 
napping more comfortable. This way, goes the backward logic, you can 
sleep in class – and stay up late studying.
The government is endeavoring to treat the core of the problem by changing cultures. 
Ripley remarked (p.42) that if it gets its reforms right, it could be a model for other 
societies. But the authorities have tried many measures over the decades, and deep-
rooted cultures are not easily changed.
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Moreover, some tutoring centers even use the regulations to their own advantage. 
In Hong Kong, China, it is not uncommon for tutorial centers to place prominent 
notices in their advertising and on the premises that they are “registered with 
the Education Bureau” with the implication that the government has somehow 
approved the content of their operations rather than just recording their existence 
and compliance with building regulations, etc. Similar problems have been noted 
in Singapore (Basu 2010:D3).
One domain that does not appear in the set of regulations reported in 
the Appendix but that does appear in other parts of the world reflects concerns 
about the danger of child abuse when adults work with children on a one-on-one 
basis in either the tutors’ or the children’s homes. For example, in Queensland, 
Australia, people working with young children need to hold a Blue Card, which 
is issued by a specialist body that first conducts criminal history checks (Druett 
2010). Similar regulations are applicable in parts of Europe (Bray 2011:58). This 
is a domain that some Asian governments might consider.
Enforcement of Regulations 
Even when regulations exist, they are not always enforced. In some cases this is 
because the governments have other priorities, but in other cases it is because 
the regulations have not been designed well. Also, some types of private tutoring 
are much more difficult to regulate than others. Commercial establishments 
with fixed premises serving clients in the neighborhood are relatively easy to 
regulate, because both the operators and the clients are visible and operate 
openly. Tutors working on a one-on-one basis in their own homes or in the 
students’ homes are more difficult to regulate, since contractual arrangements 
are commonly informal, and payments are often made in cash and perhaps 
without receipts. 
Tutoring over the internet may be even more difficult to regulate, 
particularly if the providers and clients are in different countries. When 
international operations are concerned, governments in the country of the 
provider may have different expectations from governments in the country of 
the client—and neither government is likely to find enforcement of regulations 
easy. Dhall (2011a:11) noted that some companies using the internet allow only 
text-based conversations, which are recorded so that a parent can at any time 
ask for a transcript of all sessions between tutor and student. Other companies 
use Skype and other voice-based media, and may be more lax in their approach. 
Such on-line tutoring does not entail the dangers of physical abuse of children 
that may arise when tutoring is conducted in the premises of the tutor or pupil, 
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but dangers still arise of emotional abuse through inappropriate behavior 
by tutors.
Governments wishing to regulate the tutoring sector should work from 
their own side to make processes user friendly. With reference to Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan, Silova (2010:337) noted that individuals wishing to offer private 
tutoring should register as private entrepreneurs, obtain licenses, and pay taxes on 
income from tutoring. However, she added, the procedures “are rather complex 
and do not justify related costs,” especially because most tutoring is irregular and 
seasonal. In any case, in both countries enforcement of regulations “has been 
stalled by the major rift between the legislative vision and school realities” (p.339). 
The legislation allows supplementary tutoring but without sufficient attention to 
mechanisms for the legal delivery of payments. For example, regulations stipulate 
that parents or guardians whose children receive extra tutoring from teachers in 
their schools should transfer payments to the bank accounts of those schools. 
Yet few public schools in Kazakhstan and no public schools in Tajikistan have 
their own bank accounts. Further, Silova added (p.340), the tutors have very little 
incentive to register. The authorities did not offer taxation allowances, and tutors 
in Tajikistan have to pay tax on all earnings, even if those earnings are entirely 
spent on reimbursement of costs. 
Other jurisdictions have greater sensitivity to the respective viewpoints 
of the authorities and the tutoring providers. Governments recognize that their 
demands create costs, since the tutoring providers have to keep good records 
and devote time to completing forms. The authorities may therefore make 
allowance for such demands when calculating tax requirements. They may also 
provide guidance on how to secure compliance with building regulations and 
other demands, and they can offer some forms of protection against unjustified 
consumer complaints. Such protection may be especially valued by tutors who see 
themselves as educators rather than entrepreneurs. As noted by Dhall (2011a:13): 
“Nothing in teacher training courses prepares teachers for commercial complaints 
of the nature found in business.” 
As in any domain, however, governments must be prepared for tutoring 
providers to seek loopholes that subvert the spirit even if not the letter of 
regulations. In Hong Kong, China, star tutors have found ways to circumvent 
the stipulation of maximum class size of 45 students by constructing lecture 
theaters with glass partitions. The star tutor teaches in one segment, and the 
parallel segments are served by video screens with attendants who serve as 
dummy teachers. Students can look through the glass partitions to see the live 
performance or, more conveniently, look at the video screen in that segment of 
the lecture theater. 
64 Shadow Education
Finding Partners 
Governments cannot achieve everything by themselves. As in so many other 
domains, effective steering of the shadow education system can be greatly 
facilitated by various kinds of partnership. 
A starting point for partnership is likely to be the school system itself. 
Insofar as the shadow system exists only because the school system exists, it 
is natural for governments to partner with schools for regulating and shaping 
the shadow. Schools can devise codes of conduct for the behavior of their own 
teachers, whether or not those teachers are also tutors. An increasing number 
of governments also devise codes of conduct at the national level. Most of these 
codes refer only to school teachers and their standard duties, but they can be 
enlarged to include tutors and tutoring. The Vietnamese code states that teachers 
should “not organize extra teaching and learning that violates the regulations” 
(Viet Nam 2008: Article 6) and identifies schools, universities, and teacher 
training institutions as partners for disseminating and encouraging adherence 
to the code.
Community bodies may also be important partners. Shadow education 
exists only because parents and students feel a need for it. Community bodies 
can help monitor the work of tutors and call attention to abuses. More positively, 
community bodies may collaborate with governments to encourage certain 
types of tutoring for children who need it. Among the bodies with which the 
Singapore government collaborates are the Council on Education for Malay/
Muslim Children (Mendaki) and the Singapore Indian Development Association 
(SINDA). This collaboration began in the 1980s, when the government was 
concerned about racial imbalances in educational achievement, and particularly 
the poor performance of ethnic Malays compared with Chinese (Tan 2009). The 
authorities provided financial support to enable Mendaki and SINDA to provide 
tutoring and to train tutors, who worked voluntarily or for low fees. Tutorial 
schemes set up by these bodies have remained vigorous (Yayasan Mendaki 2010: 
9; SINDA 2011:12).
Other partners may be within the tutoring industry itself. In some 
countries, associations of tutors have been formed for self-regulation. Examples 
are the Japan Juku Association (www.jja.or.jp), the [People’s Republic of] 
China Education Training Union (www.cetu.net.cn), and the Great Taichung 
Supplementary Education Association (www.tcschool.org.tw) in Taipei,China. 
Outside the region, bodies such as the National Tutoring Association (www.
ntatutor.com) in the US and the Australian Tutoring Association (www.ata.edu.
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au) provide further models that might be encouraged. These bodies exist chiefly 
to protect their own interests; but collaboration with governments to show that 
tutoring is a respectable occupation with high standards could indeed be seen as 
a worthwhile goal.
Learning from the Shadow
Rather than just reacting defensively to the expansion of shadow education, 
policy makers should ask why it exists in the first place and what they can usefully 
learn from it. As noted in the first chapter of this study, just as the shadow cast by 
a sundial can tell observers about the time of day, so the shadow of an education 
system can tell observers about features of mainstream education systems. Some 
types of shadow education indicate shortcomings in mainstream school systems 
that policy makers may be able to remedy. Other types of shadow education are 
shaped by wider socioeconomic forces that may be beyond the control of policy 
makers but that should at least be understood. 
The questions that policy makers may ask themselves include the following:
•	 What does the shadow system offer to parents and students that the 
regular schools do not offer, and how can regular schools expand and 
improve their services?
•	 How do tutoring companies attract clients, and should schools also be 
more client-oriented?
•	 How do tutoring companies attract staff, in some cases even from 
regular schools, and what implications does this have for mainstream 
education systems? 
•	 When teachers and governments claim that effective teaching and 
learning cannot take place in classes of 40 or more, how is it that at 
least some families and students are willing to pay for huge lecture-
style classes of star tutors in such cities as Bangkok, Colombo, and 
Hong Kong, China?
•	 When education authorities insist that teachers must have training 
to enter classrooms, how is it that many families and students are 
willing to pay for the services of untrained tutors, some of whom are 
themselves only university students or even secondary students? 
•	 Why are at least some tutoring companies much more clearly at 
the cutting edge of technology and curriculum development for 
effective learning and teaching than schools, even in well-resourced 
education systems?
66 Shadow Education
•	 What are the implications for fee-free education policies of the fact 
that many parents across the region are clearly able and willing to pay 
for shadow education?
•	 To what extent could mainstream schools provide the same sort 
of flexibility in timing and content of teaching and learning that is 
provided in the shadow?
•	 What do tutors emphasize in their advertising, and what does that tell 
about parents’ state of mind and reasons for hiring tutors?
•	 Should policy makers actively seek to manage perceptions of 
mainstream schools?
Such questions may be useful prods to improvement in mainstream schooling—
and thus avenues for public education systems to serve the public more efficiently 
and effectively. 
This study has also shown the value of comparative analysis. Policy makers 
should not only compare the nature of shadow education and regular education 
in their own jurisdictions but should also look across boundaries to consider the 
factors underlying similarities and differences among countries. Sometimes it is 
useful to take pairs of countries, such as Japan and Republic of Korea, Bangladesh, 
and India, Malaysia and Singapore, or Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic. In 
addition, policy makers can look across the region as a whole to see the mosaic of 
patterns; and indeed they can look beyond the region to identify similarities and 
differences with other regions of the world. Space here does not permit detailed 
comparison of world regions, but it is worth noting that Europe, like Asia, 
contains both former socialist countries and long-standing capitalist countries. It 
also has some societies in which shadow education is very extensive next to other 
societies in which it is modest in scale (Bray 2011). Africa also has conditions 
that resemble parts of Asia, with a diversity of economic circumstances and some 
parallel colonial legacies that have shaped forms of shadow education (Bray 
and Suso 2008). And North America has examples of franchised companies, 
innovative use of technologies, and diverse forms of public-private partnership 
(Davies and Aurini 2004, Burch 2009). 
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Conclusions
Shadow education has a long history in parts of Asia. Box 2 at the beginning 
of this study noted an official comment on the phenomenon in Ceylon (now 
Sri Lanka) in 1943. In the Republic of Korea, the decades of active government 
concern and action have been even more prominent. However, in most parts of 
the region private tutoring has been ignored by policy makers. Even in Japan, 
where juku have long been known to play a major role in the lives of young 
people, the authorities have historically preferred a laissez-faire stance.
Shadow education can no longer be ignored. The chief reason is that it 
has grown significantly throughout the region and shows every sign of further 
growth. While some dimensions of this growth might be welcomed as ways to 
extend the provision of education and build human capital, shadow education 
brings threats to government goals of social equality. Shadow education is much 
less about remedial help for students to keep up with their peers, and much 
more about competition and creation of differentials. It may also contribute to 
inefficiencies in education systems, and even to elements of corruption.
Driving Forces
In remarks about the demand for tutoring, this study has highlighted the roles of 
selection mechanisms at transition points in education systems, cultural factors, 
parental perceptions of qualitative shortcomings in regular schools, and the 
combination of increased wealth and smaller families. These determinants of 
demand have operated within a context of overall expansion of education systems. 
The goals of Education for All were endorsed by the global community in Jomtien, 
Thailand, in 1990 and reaffirmed in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000 (World Conference 
on Education for All 1990, World Education Forum 2000); and universal primary 
education is one of the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United 
Nations (2000). As countries have progressed toward, and achieved, universal 
primary education, they have experienced pressure to expand lower secondary 
education. And as they have achieved expansion of lower secondary education, 
they have experienced pressure to expand upper secondary education and higher 
education. Thus, enrollment rates at all levels have greatly risen in Asia during 
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the last two decades. With expansion of the mainstream has come expansion of 
the shadow.
Another broad trend has been the increased acceptability of marketization 
in the education sector. Many countries have socialist legacies, whether as part of 
the former Soviet Union or as independent nations such as the PRC, Lao PDR, 
Mongolia, and Viet Nam. Before the 1990s, in these countries the operation of free 
markets in any sector—and perhaps especially in education—was very limited. 
Economic and political reforms have permitted and encouraged the delivery of 
education through private channels alongside public ones. Marketization has 
also become increasingly evident in such countries as Bangladesh, Malaysia, and 
Singapore, which have always had capitalist systems but in which education has 
been seen mostly as primarily a government responsibility. Thus the expansion of 
shadow education reflects wider changes in the role of the state.
The expansion of shadow education may also be linked to the forces of 
globalization and increasing competition. Families have always invested in 
education in order to maintain or advance their social and economic positions 
(Box 9). But whereas in earlier decades social and economic positioning was 
mainly in the context of local and national conditions, now it is shaped by the 
forces of globalization, which are accompanied by mobility of capital and of 
labor. Education is widely seen as a core instrument to “win” in the competitive 
Box 9 Shadow Education as a Positional Good 
Educational qualifications may be valued by individuals as a positional good. The 
chief determinant of whether people consider themselves to have secured enough 
qualifications is whether the amount is adequate relative to the amounts held by 
peers and competitors. In former eras a senior secondary qualification distinguished 
an individual from the crowd; later it had to be a university degree; and now in many 
societies it needs to be a postgraduate degree (Hollis 1982).
To explain how shadow education may be viewed as a positional good, it is 
useful to consider a sports stadium. When all spectators in a sports stadium are 
sitting down, then everybody can see the game easily. But if a row of people at the 
front stand up, then the people behind them also have to stand up if they still want to 
see the game. And when that happens, the people behind them have to stand up, too. 
Eventually almost everybody is standing up. The only exceptions are the ones who 
cannot stand up – and for them the consequence is that they can only hear and not 
see the game. Likewise, when private tutoring is received by one group, other groups 
feel that they must follow until almost everybody is receiving it – and those who do 
not are disadvantaged.
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environment; and, by corollary, lack of education is widely seen as a factor that 
limits career and other opportunities. 
Diversity in Patterns 
Within this broad picture, different emphases must be recognized in different 
locations. In almost all countries, urban areas are better served than rural areas; 
and in some countries the shadow system has penetrated more deeply than 
others. Around Asia it is useful to note three separate groups of countries:
•	 East Asia has the longest history of prominent shadow education, but 
is exhibiting further growth of the shadow, particularly in the PRC.
•	 South Asia has common features arising from British colonial legacies, 
cultural traits, and economic structures. Incomes are relatively low, 
though growing dynamically in some areas, for instance, parts of 
India. Parts of Southeast Asia (such as Cambodia) may also be grouped 
with South Asia, while other parts (such as Singapore) may be grouped 
with East Asia.
•	 The countries of Northern, Central, and Western Asia are still 
addressing the legacies of the former Soviet Union and the abrupt 
arrival of the market economy in the 1990s. This led to great expansion 
of the shadow education sector, which cannot now easily be forced 
to contract.
Of course within these subregions is further diversity. For example, the features 
of shadow education in Japan are different from those in the Republic of Korea; 
and the features in Malaysia are different from those in Singapore. Also, within 
countries different amounts of shadow education may be consumed by girls 
compared with boys, and by different ethnic and racial groups.
Organizational diversity is also evident in the providers and curricula of 
shadow education. In Cambodia, most tutoring is provided by teachers, whereas 
in Hong Kong, China, it is provided by individuals, small companies, or large 
companies. In Mongolia, most tutoring is labor intensive, while entrepreneurs 
in Japan make use of computers and other forms of technology. Whereas most 
shadow education follows the teaching of the school system, some precedes it with 
lessons in advance. And while the dominant content of tutoring closely mimics 
school curricula, some content goes beyond it and seeks ways to complement and 
expand on what the school system offers.
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Likewise, considerable diversity exists in the forms, intensities, and seasons 
of tutoring. The forms include one-on-one instruction, small group work, large 
classes, huge lecture theaters, and internet tutoring. The intensities may range from 
just 1 or 2 hours a semester to 10 or more hours per week. Concerning seasons, 
tutoring may be received only in the period just before major examinations, 
especially towards the end of senior secondary schooling; or it may be received 
throughout a child’s school career, commencing in grade 1 (or even before). All 
these factors require policy makers to assess local circumstances as well as broad 
international patterns.
Inequalities and Inefficiencies
It is self-evident that more prosperous families are able to purchase greater 
quantities and better qualities of supplementary tutoring than can low-income 
families. The expansion of shadow education thus has major implications for 
social stratification. It undermines the official statements about fee-free education 
and creates threats to social cohesion. 
In some settings it may be argued that tutoring operates as a safety valve 
that allows elites to maintain certain advantages in the face of government policies 
that otherwise promote equality. With reference to Japan, for example, Harnisch 
observed two decades ago (1994:330) that juku “close a sensitive gap in the … 
education system between the teaching at public schools and the demands of the 
entrance exams”; and Dawson (2010:17) has made a similar point with reference 
to the ways that juku may permit families to navigate their way in the face of 
official egalitarian rhetoric. Yet resentment of social inequalities perpetuated 
through shadow education could be a serious threat to social cohesion in many 
parts of the region. Bari (2012) highlighted the challenge with reference to 
Pakistan, which he described as “a very unequal, fragmented and almost bitterly 
divided society” in which the differential access to private tutoring “is only 
exacerbating the situation.” Other commentators would echo this observation in 
multiple contexts. As noted by Ali and Zhuang (2007:4–5):
…increases in the absolute gaps between the rich and poor and 
very visible changes in the consumption patterns and lifestyles of 
the rich are leading to a perceptible increase in social and political 
tensions, undermining social cohesiveness.… Persistent and growing 
inequalities in access to social services such as education and health, 
exacerbated by income inequalities, are … a significant concern. 
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The emphasis on “inclusive growth” by the Asian Development Bank (2010) 
recognizes the importance of including equity in economic agendas; and 
writers such as Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) have argued that “equality is better 
for everyone.”
Concerning inefficiencies, Calero et al. (2011:17) remarked that many 
families “overinvest in certain kinds of private tutoring because of a lack of 
information about the actual benefits of such investment.” Regular schooling is 
difficult to evaluate, especially by parents, who have neither the tools nor the data 
to make such evaluations. Supplementary tutoring may be even more difficult to 
evaluate, because much of it is semiformal. In addition, tutoring companies in 
many countries deliberately misrepresent the effectiveness of their work in order 
to attract clients. 
Other inefficiencies arise from the interactions of the shadow and the 
mainstream. Teachers may reduce their efforts if they feel that compensatory 
provision for pupils is available in the private sector; and teachers who are also 
tutors may choose to reserve their energies for their private work rather than 
their public work. In the most problematic cases, teachers who provide extra 
tutoring for their own students may deliberately reduce the content during 
regular lessons in order to ensure ongoing demand for the private lessons. Some 
tutoring companies recruit the best teachers from the school system, thereby 
taking them away from the mainstream. Although shadow education is usually 
described as a form of private supplementary education, from the perspective of 
the mainstream it may subtract as well as add. 
The Way Ahead
The diversity of circumstances has been constantly stressed throughout this 
publication, because it exposes the complexity of the work of policy makers. 
Nevertheless, some broad lines of action are clear. The first is to recognize the 
existence, nature, and implications of shadow education. In most parts of Asia 
enough is known about the broad outlines, even though detailed research would 
reveal the features more clearly. The question then is about the actions that policy 
makers should take to encourage the positive dimensions of shadow education 
and limit the negative ones. 
Within this publication, particular emphasis has been given to the 
experiences of the Republic of Korea. This is partly because the best data come 
from that country. Korean policy makers have been actively concerned about 
issues of shadow education for longer than their counterparts elsewhere, and 
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the country has a university sector with strong research capacity. The Korean 
experience sounds a major warning to other parts of the region. It shows that, 
once shadow education structures and habits become entrenched, they are very 
difficult to change. The Korean authorities have tried in many ways, and with 
considerable effort, to reduce what they see as the undesirable financial burdens 
of shadow education and its concomitant pressures on young people. Around 
2010, there was some sign that their efforts might be delivering some results. 
A combination of regulation to limit the operating hours of hagwons, social 
awareness campaigns to highlight the harmful dimensions of shadow education, 
reform of assessment systems, and alternative channels for learning through the 
EBS and CHLS did seem to be having some effect.
Other governments might take the view that “prevention is better than 
cure.” In 2011, the government of Bhutan, having looked at the experiences of 
other countries, decided to maintain a prohibition on the operation of tutoring 
companies in that country (Choden 2011). Elsewhere the shadow education 
system has already emerged but can still be shaped. The authorities in the PRC, 
for example, could usefully look at the Korean experience and take action to steer 
the development of the shadow education system before structures, habits, and 
social expectations become entrenched. 
In other parts of the region, shadow education has become firmly rooted, 
and the question for policy makers is how to live with it and seek symbiosis 
rather than how to eradicate it. In these countries, much can be learned from 
comparative analysis of different modes of regulation and of the dangers of 
unintended consequences of well-meaning policies. Much also can be learned 
about ways to form partnerships between the public and private sectors.
Thus, the overall message of this study is that shadow education needs to 
be addressed much more actively by policy makers in most parts of the region. 
This is desirable even in locations where shadow education is not currently very 
visible, on the grounds that prevention of undesirable dimensions is better than 
cure. The domain is complex, but appropriate ways forward will be found much 
more easily if the sector is actively discussed rather than ignored.
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Regulations on Private Tutoring 
Location Regulations
Bangladesh According to the Non-government Secondary School Teachers 
Service Rules1979, no full-time teacher may provide private 
tutoring or other employment without prior permission of the 
employing authority (Article 9). In 2010 and 2011, various 
public comments demanded tightening of the regulations. 
The High Court became involved, raising the pressure on the 
Ministry of Education and on various schools from which 
teachers were said also to be working in coaching centers 
(The Daily Star, 5 January 2012). 
Bhutan Private tutoring both by regular teachers and by commercial 
operators is prohibited. In 2011, the Ministry of Education 
noted that, despite this prohibition, increasing numbers of 
parents were sending their children to tutoring after school 
hours and during weekends. The Ministry had received several 
applications by entrepreneurs to establish private tutorial 
centers, and considered allowing them to do so. However, 
a consultation paper received a negative response from the 
education community, and the Ministry decided to maintain 
its prohibition.
Brunei 
Darussalam
The Education Order and Registration of Teachers Regulations 
require tutors and their institutions to be registered (Negara 
Brunei Darussalam 2003, 2004). A 2009 circular heralded 
a crackdown on teachers in both public and private schools 
who were providing extra classes without permission (Waleed 
2009). It particularly targeted the practice of private tutoring in 
private residences and rented accommodations. 
Cambodia In the mid-1990s, the Cambodian government attempted to 
ban private supplementary tutoring. However, the measure 
was ineffective. The subdecree on teacher ethics approved 
in 2008 prohibits teachers from collecting money, charging 
informal fees, or running businesses in classrooms (Article 13). 
It also states that teachers must avoid running a business in 
state schools. 
continued on next page
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China, People’s 
Republic of
Private, or nonpublic, institutions are known as minban 
enterprises. The Minban Education Enhancement Law 
(China, People’s Republic of 2002) covered tutoring centers 
alongside other institutions. It stated that they may enjoy tax 
allowances and earn a reasonable economic return. Subsequent 
regulations (China, People’s Republic of 2004) stated that 
tutors in tutorial centers should have the same minimum 
qualifications as teachers in schools. Paid private tutoring by 
public school teachers is strongly discouraged. The national 
Rules of Professional Ethics of Teachers indicate that teachers 
“should reject paid tutoring with consciousness, and should 
not gain personal profit from their positions as teachers” (China, 
People’s Republic of, Ministry of Education 2008: Item 5). 
Initiatives in Shanghai provide an example of subnational 
approaches. The government has introduced merit-pay salary 
reforms to reduce the economic incentives for teachers to 
undertake tutoring (Shanghai Education Commission 2009). 
Georgia Private tutoring has never been prohibited. The Revised 
National Curriculum (2011–2016) permits schools to provide 
additional fee-charging educational services if (a) the service 
is not provided by the teachers of the school, (b) the service 
is not provided as a regular lesson, and/or (c) the service is 
not provided to a student while regular lessons are conducted 
(Article 12.I, II). The 2010 Teachers’ Code of Ethics issued by 
the Ministry of Education and Sciences (Article 4.III) guides 
teachers “not to tutor their own students for profit-making 
purposes except in those cases covered by the law.” 
Hong Kong, 
China
Chapter 279F of the Laws of Hong Kong, as modified in 2004, 
permits tutorial centers to be classified as private schools 
offering nonformal curriculum. Tutorial centers must register 
if they provide for 20 or more persons during any one day or 
eight or more persons at any one time. To register, they must 
demonstrate that their premises comply with the regulations 
of the Fire Services Department; and class size is restricted to a 
maximum of 45 students. 
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Location Regulations
India Regulations are set at the state and local levels. In Uttar Pradesh, 
coaching centers should register under Coaching Regulation 
Ordinance 2002, though not all do so (Sujatha and Rani 
2011:143). In Maharashtra, coaching centers are registered 
under the Shop Act of the State Revenue Department, while 
bureaus that provide tutors for home tutoring are registered 
under the Charity Commission Act. Registered coaching 
centers pay 1% tax to the Revenue Department, while tuition 
bureaus pay 8% service charge to the Charity Commission 
(Sujatha and Rani 2011:152). The West Bengal government 
prohibits teachers from providing tutoring, though it has 
had difficulty implementing the prohibition (Times of India 
2010). A similar situation is evident in Tripura (The Telegraph 
2011). During 2011, the authorities in northern India attracted 
media attention with a blanket ban on private tutoring by 
college teachers (Malla 2011). The authorities added that 
government teachers were allowed to provide private tutoring 
only after school hours. In effect, this amounted to approval 
of government teachers providing tutoring on their own time. 
Japan Dierkes (2010:25) stated that “shadow education institutions 
are entirely unregulated as educational institutions and 
only have a legal role as a small (and sometimes very large) 
business.” In 1988, regulations were established for regulation 
of juku by the then Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(Mori and Baker 2010:44).
Kazakhstan The delivery of supplementary educational services is regulated 
by Decree 1438 of 1999 (Kalikova and Rakhimzhanova 
2009:94). Private tutoring is defined as the provision of 
additional classes in school subjects to students on an individual 
basis in addition to the academic hours prescribed by the state 
curricula. Schools are also permitted to offer supplementary 
programs.
Korea,  
Republic of
In 1980, the Korean authorities issued a blanket prohibition 
of tutoring. This, however, was ineffective. It was relaxed by 
stages, and in 2000 was declared unconstitutional (Lee and Jang 
2010). Since that time, the emphasis has been on standards in 
tutoring centers (hagwons) including both the physical facilities 
and the qualifications of instructors. Inspections are conducted 
to ensure compliance. In 2009, the national government 
enacted a bill requiring tutoring sessions to end by 10:00 pm 
(Kim and Chang 2010). This built on the regulations of various 
provincial authorities that had been introduced during the 
previous 5 years (Kim and Park 2010:415).
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Malaysia A Ministry of Education circular (Malaysia 2006) indicated 
that teachers may provide tutoring outside school hours for 
up to 4 hours per week if granted a renewable permit valid 
for 1 year. Application should be made at least 2 months in 
advance, and applicants should be confirmed in their jobs and 
have scored at least 80% in the previous year’s performance 
appraisal. Teachers are not permitted to use school premises or 
equipment for tutoring, or to promote their tutoring services 
to students in school either orally or through pamphlets and 
other means. Teachers who have been granted the permit must 
offer their services through tuition centers registered with the 
state department of education and not owned by their family 
members or relatives.
Mongolia Teachers are prohibited by a 2006 amendment to the Laws on 
Education and by the 2007 code of ethics from tutoring their 
own students in mainstream schools (Silova 2010:338). Section 
2 of the Code states that teachers “shall not force students to 
purchase books, educational materials, and other items… and 
offer private tutoring instigated by teachers.” Offenders are 
liable for fines or revocation of their teaching certificates.
Myanmar A 1984 law prohibited government teachers from providing 
supplementary private tutoring, though the law was widely 
ignored. A 2006 crackdown led to some prosecutions (Yeni 
2006), though again the prohibition proved unworkable.
Singapore Under the private education regulations (Singapore 2009), 
tutoring centers are required to register with the Council 
for Private Education via a business arm of the Singapore 
Government. Enterprises are exempted if their courses last 
less than 1 month or 50 hours. The regulations require at 
least one fully enclosed classroom and a designated area for 
administration. Tutors must meet a minimum educational level.
Sri Lanka Responsibility for administration of education is shared between 
the national government and nine provincial councils. In 2010, 
some provincial councils expressed disquiet about private 
tutoring. The Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council banned private 
tutoring of children between the ages of 5 and 16 between 
8:00 am and 2:00 pm on Sundays and on the monthly Buddhist 
days of religious observance known as Poya Days. According to 
Jayamanne (2010), offenders who violated the law more than 
once “would have to pay a fine of not less than 5,000 rupees 
[US$45] and undergo 6 months rigorous imprisonment.”
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Location Regulations
Taipei,China Regulations are determined at the local level. The 
Supplementary and Continuing Education Law (Taipei,China 
Ministry of Education 2004) states that short-term learning 
centers may operate with “the approval of the competent 
educational authority in the appropriate special municipality, 
county, or county-level city.” The relevant authority decides 
on conditions and procedures for the establishment and 
accreditation of centers, facilities and management, teachers, 
method of collecting fees, number of students per class, 
inspections, awards, conditions for cancellation and revocation 
of accreditation, and administrative regulations. This level of 
decentralization leads to much diversity.
Tajikistan The 2004 Law on Education defines a private tutor as “a 
teacher who offers tutoring to students on an individual basis 
or in groups, beyond the [official] working hours at school or 
university” (Kodirov and Amonov 2009:145). Article 24 permits 
parents or other custodians to request state secondary schools 
to arrange supplementary classes for a fee. Supplementary 
tutoring may be carried out in (a) program and subjects that 
are not covered by the state education curriculum, (b) in-depth 
study of topics that are not covered by educational institutions, 
and (c) other types of educational services that exceed state 
education standards.
Thailand Tutoring centers may register as nonformal schools under the 
Private School Act (Thailand, Kingdom of 2007). According to 
Dhall (2011b), if they do so, they are permitted to use the word 
“school” in their name and to earn a maximum profit of 20%. 
They are exempt from business taxes.
Viet Nam A regulation issued by the Ministry of Education and Training 
in 2007 permitted organizations and individuals to provide 
tutoring only if granted a permit by the local authority. They 
were forbidden to offer private tutoring to students who had 
already studied two sessions (in a country where many schools 
operated a double-shift system) of formal schooling per day 
(Dang 2011a). 
Regulations on Private Tutoring continued
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Shadow Education
Private Supplementary Tutoring and Its Implications for Policy Makers in Asia
In all parts of Asia, households devote considerable expenditures to 
private supplementary tutoring. This tutoring may contribute to students’ 
achievement, but it also maintains and exacerbates social inequalities, 
diverts resources from other uses, and can contribute to inefficiencies in 
education systems.
 Such tutoring is widely called shadow education, because it mimics 
school systems. As the curriculum in the school system changes, so does
the shadow. 
 This study documents the scale and nature of shadow education in 
different parts of the region. For many decades, shadow education has 
been a major phenomenon in East Asia. Now it has spread throughout the 
region, and it has far-reaching economic and social implications.
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